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ABSTRACT
Using natural resources sustainably while reducing poverty is one of the greatest
global challenges, especially in developing countries where rural communities rely on
natural resources for their livelihood. In this dissertation, I examine the interactions
between poverty and natural resource depletions in the coastal communities of
Tanzania. Chapter 1 explores the effects of subsidies and social nudges on collective
action by resource users and whether extrinsic motivation crowd out intrinsic
motivation for those actions. The results from a framed field experiment conducted in
coastal communities in Tanzania reveal that while the subsidies and social nudges
themselves motivate the resource users to allocate more time to plant mangroves, the
combination of subsidies and social nudges decrease intrinsic motivations. Chapters 2
and 3 use panel household survey data collected from resource-dependent households
in coastal Tanzania to analyze the interaction between shocks and households’ natural
resource use. Chapter 2 investigates the problem of drinking water salinization as a
potential source of chronic poverty. We find that the level of salinity in the drinking
water wells increases time spent to collect water, thereby decreasing labor. In chapter
3, we examine the potential tradeoff between extractive and non-extractive benefits
from mangrove forests and whether these benefits correlate with poverty. The results
suggest that households who experience more shocks engaged in more fishing, a nonextractive benefit of mangrove forests that serves as a safety net to the households
especially the poorest ones. Additionally, the poorer households tend to also rely more
on the extractive benefits of the mangrove, such as using as cooking energy and build
materials.
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PREFACE
I use manuscript format for this dissertation. There are three manuscripts
which constitute the entire work. The goal of this dissertation is to provide the
understanding of the mechanisms inducing chronic poverty and natural resource
depletion. The first manuscript is co-authored with Emi Uchida, Hirotsugu Uchida,
and Razack Lokina. It is being prepared to submit to Ecological Economics. The
second manuscript is co-authored with Cathy McNally, Arthur Gold, and Emi Uchida.
It is being prepared to submit to Nature Sustainability. The third manuscript is coauthored with Emi Uchida. It is being prepared to submit to World Development.

Manuscript 1: Crowding Effect of Subsidies and Social Nudges on Intrinsic
Motivation for Contribution to a Common Pool Resource: Results from a Framed
Field Experiment in Tanzania

Manuscript 2: Impact of drinking water salinization to productivity of labor: The case
study of coastal communities in Tanzania

Manuscript 3: Dependency on natural resources as a source of chronic poverty: The
role of coastal natural resources as safety nets
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Crowding Effect of Subsidies and Social Nudges on Intrinsic Motivation for
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Abstract
Incentives are often used to change the behaviors of users of common pool resources.
Such extrinsic motivation, however, could inevitably interact with intrinsic motivation
of individuals, and the net effect is not easily predictable. This study investigates the
impact of social nudges and incentives on activities to enhance a common pool
resource, and whether these extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation. We
develop a new contextualized, framed field experiment to test the effect of social
nudges (social norm, recognition, and shaming) and different levels of subsidies on
labor contributed towards common pool resource. The results from random effect
models suggest that people are more cooperative and increase labor contribution with
social nudges and a high level of subsidy. However, when a high level of subsidy is
offered in combination with information about social norms, it crowds out intrinsic
motivation. These findings suggest that subsidies will not always lead to more
contribution to common pool resources, especially in contexts in which volunteering
in public works is a social norm. Instead, social nudges alone could be a more
effective and less costly intervention compared to subsidies.
JEL Classification: D91, C93, Q57
Keywords: social nudges, in-kind subsidy, crowding effects, social norm, altruism,
Tanzania, framed field experiment
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1. Introduction
Sustainable management of common-pool resources is a social dilemma
requiring voluntary cooperation (Ostorm, 2008). The key primary principles of
collective action include access rules, shared norms among the users, and provision of
monitoring, sanction, and enforcement (Ostrom, 1990; Hanna and Mäler,1995; Steins
and Edwards, 1999; Baland and Platteau, 1999; Agrawal, 2003). Individual decisions
for common-pool resource use are shaped by extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of
resource users (Brent et al, 2017). Extrinsic motivation usually involves tangible
punishments and rewards such as conservation subsidies and taxes or a conditional
cash transfer (e.g., payment for ecosystem services). In contrast, intrinsic motivation is
dependent on individual and social characteristics such as warm grow or altruism. 1
When an incentive is offered to change the behaviors of resource users, such
extrinsic motivation could inevitably interact with intrinsic motivation of individuals,
and the net effect on the behavior of resource users is not easily predictable (D’Adda,
2011; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012). If extrinsic motivation complements intrinsic
motivation, the level of incentives would positively correlate with the level of prosocial behavior: the higher the incentive, the higher the pro-social behavior. In this
case, extrinsic motivation is said to crowd-in intrinsic motivation (Rode et al., 2015).
Conversely, if the extrinsic motivation is a substitute for intrinsic motivation, the
individuals would reduce the original level of pro-social behavior, becoming less
cooperative, in which case extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic motivation. This
ambiguous theoretical prediction indicates that more empirical studies investigating
1

Extrinsic motivation related policies could be viewed as pecuniary policies while intrinsic motivation
related policies could be viewed as non-pecuniary policies
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the interaction of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation of the individuals are needed to
mitigate the undesirable crowding effect.
This study conducts a new contextualized, framed field experiment to
investigate the impact of social nudges and subsidies on forest conservation and test
for crowd-out effects. We adapt a public goods game to the context of management of
coastal forests in Tanzania utilized by small fishing communities. Fishing
communities in Tanzania typically face the tradeoff between utilizing extractive and
non-extractive benefits of mangrove forests. While harvesting mangrove trees for raw
materials provide extractive benefits, communities will lose their non-extractive
benefit such as habitat for fish and shrimp, which in turn are important sources of
income and protein. Our game adapts the public goods game to incorporate this
tradeoff into the choices of time allocation between fishing and planting mangrove
trees. 2 More time spent in fishing will in turn reduce time spent in mangrove planting,
which eventually result in less habitat for fish, and reduced fish stocks. To motivate
the fishers to contribute time towards planting tree seedlings, we test how extrinsic
motivation (subsidizing with additional labor for planting activities) and social nudges
impact the intrinsic motivation of the community members to contribute to mangrove
planting. We employ random effect model to estimate the treatment impact on
contribution of time that people allocate in planting. The random effect model
accounts for unobservable factors within the individuals who are randomly chosen into
the treatments.

2

The time allocation is hypothetical and the decisions happen in the game only.

4

The analysis of the experiment data reveals three major findings. First, labor
subsidies, or the additional labor offered externally to increase the common pool
resource, motivate collective action, either when the subsidies are given at a low or
high level. Second, social nudges, such as recognizing the individuals who behave
pro-socially and shaming the ones who do not occupy pro-social behavior, motivate
collective action as well. In terms of the magnitude, a high level of subsidy can
motivate collective action the most, followed by social nudges and then a low level of
subsidy. Third, the combination of subsidies and social nudges deteriorate collective
action. When the social norm is combined with a high level of subsidy, labor
contributions to the collective action decrease; in other words, this combination of
extrinsic motivation crowds out the intrinsic motivation of the resource users. The
crowding-out effect is also found when the shaming treatment is employed with a low
level of subsidy.
This study has two contributions to the literature. First, we add new empirical
evidence about the interactions between crowding effects between extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation. We investigate the effect of the combination of the two types of
extrinsic motivations: labor subsidy and social nudge. Previous studies tested
crowding effects either of a subsidy or social nudges (Lopez et al., 2012; D’Adda,
2011; Kaczan et al., 2019), toward intrinsic motivation; we test the effect of a
combination of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations (Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2016; Putra
et al., 2017). It is important to test a combination of both motivations because in an
actual resource management setting, communities typically have more than one type
of incentives--both formal and informal institutions as well as external interventions--
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to manage common-pool resources. An external subsidy could interact not only with
intrinsic motivation of the individuals, but could also substitute or complement with
the existing social norms.
The second contribution of this study is that we design a tailored public goods
game that simulates social and ecological linkages in coastal forest management. In a
traditional public goods game, contributions from each participant add up to total
public contribution for the specific resource and this same resource proportionally
generates direct benefit back to the participants. Our game works in a way that
contribution from each participant adds up to one resource (i.e., mangrove trees)
which generates an ecosystem service (i.e., fish habitat) to another resource (i.e., fish
stock) which benefits all participants. While this design is more complicated than the
typical public goods game, it provides a familiar setting for the subjects.
2. Literature review: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivations
The crowding effects between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation have gained
interest among social psychologists and economists in the last fifty years (e.g.,
Mellström and Johannesson, 2008, Titmuss, 1970). In the psychology literature, a
crowding effect is conceptualized by cognitive evaluation theory, which states that
intrinsic motivation originating from the feelings of competence and control could
diminish by external stimuli (Kaczan et al., 2019; Tabernero and Hernández, 2011). In
economics, intrinsic motivation in the utility function of the individuals is generated
from pure altruism and is claimed to be negatively correlated with extrinsic
motivation, such as financial incentives (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bowles and
Polanía-Reyes, 2012). Crowding-out effects, therefore, could occur when the agents
6

are given financial incentives to behave pro-socially. Subsidies from the nongovernment organizations (NGOs) have also been found to crowd out conservation
behavior. For instance, subsidies to promote the maintenance of water and soil
conservation in rural India decreased pro-social motivations in a trust game (Bouma et
al., 2008). However, other studies found that crowding-out effect depends on the
social norm in the community (Kerr et al., 2012; Narloch et al., 2012). In these studies,
financial incentives did not affect the level of contribution where people were already
willing to contribute to the community’s public works, but in other areas without such
norm, group and individual financial incentives led to more contribution.
Theoretical models offer a variety of predictions on the crowding effect of
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations on collective actions. There are two possible
outcomes of the crowding effect from intangible extrinsic motivation. First, the theory
of conditional cooperation states that individuals will contribute more if they observe
that others have been contributing (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Neugebauer et al., 2009).
For instance, Lopez et al. (2012) found that employing pressure on the through guilt
and shame induced higher pro-social behavior than implementing a formal regulation.
Specifically, the level of cooperation by Colombian fishermen in cleaning a beach was
higher when the level of individual contribution was revealed to the others than when
they were penalized if they violated the rules. An increase in overall contribution
when the contribution was revealed could indicate that the individuals contributed
more because they observed the others were contributing. Several lab and field
experiments have also found that people contribute according to the expectation of

7

others’ contributions (Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Crosan, 2009; Chaudhuri,
2011; Ferraro and Price, 2013).
In contrast, the theory of pure altruism predicts that the individuals with prosocial behavior will reduce their contribution to the public goods if they observe that
other people contribute as well, but that they will increase contribution when others
are not willing to contribute (Clotfelter, 1997). A study in the context of Bolivian
forest users found that the subjects contributed less with shaming, i.e., when the level
of contribution was revealed, especially among individuals who previously engaged in
public works (D’Adda, 2011). However, the net effect of extrinsic and intrinsic
interaction has resulted in varied outcomes and has found to be heterogeneous across
individuals (Kaczan et al., 2019; Handberg and Angelsen, 2019). Our study aims to
offer a new empirical evidence to this debate by testing a mix of nudges and
incentives.
3. Conceptual Framework
The behavioral economics literature provides theoretical insights to understand
why people contribute private benefits voluntarily towards public goods. Our study
adapts a model of pro-social behavior in Benabou and Tirole (2006). In this model, the
motivation of pro-social behavior consists of extrinsic, intrinsic, and reputational
motives. We adapt this model to individual decisions to contribute labor to plant
mangrove trees, which is modeled as a common pool resource because the benefits
accrue to everyone in the community. One key benefit of mangrove trees is to provide
a critical fish habitat, especially as a nursery ground for shrimp, crabs and juvenile
fish, which in turn can increase productivity of fishing activities. In this model, each
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individual decides on how many hours of labor l to contribute to tree planting activity.
This decision incurs cost c(l), which is the opportunity cost of time that they can
otherwise spend on fishing activity which results in private benefits. An external
agency provides additional labor hours as a subsidy (s).3 The intrinsic valuation of
contributing l hours to planting are vl and vs, where vl is the intrinsic valuation or a
warm-glow benefits for contributing to public good, and vs is the intrinsic valuation for
receiving private benefit4, induced by receiving s units of subsidy or the extrinsic
motivation. The private benefit is a yield from labor subsidy (vs), which is additional
income from fishing resulting from larger fish habitat provided by planting mangrove
trees. By choosing a number of hours in planting (l), the individuals will receive a
direct benefit, which is not observable by others, as
(𝑣𝑙 + 𝑣𝑠 𝑠)𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑙).

(1)

Social norms could also lead individuals to behave pro-socially when they care
about how their reputation will be recognized by others. This reputational motivation
works when ones’ actions in the contribution are observed by the rest of the group.
Recognition and shaming treatments in this experiment fall into this type of
motivation. We assume that the reputational motivation is a linear function of the
posterior expectation of the observers of the individual’s type v. The payoff from
reputational motivation from contributing l hours with s subsidy is
𝑅(𝑙, 𝑠) ≡ 𝑝[𝛼𝑙 𝐸(𝑣𝑙 |𝑙, 𝑠) − 𝛼𝑠 𝐸(𝑣𝑠 |𝑙, 𝑠)],

3

(2)

An example would be a nonprofit organization arranges to send volunteers to plant mangrove trees.
We frame the private benefit from receiving labor subsidy such that an agent will gain more fish as a
result of more habitat compared to the same level of labor contribution to planting without receiving
subsidy.
4

9

where E is the posterior expectation of the observer, 𝛼l ≥ 0 reflects individual payoff
from when others observe their contribution in public planting, and 𝛼 s ≥ 0 reflects
individual payoff when others observe their receiving of labor subsidy to plant. p is
probability that the number of contributions being observed by others. Defining 𝜇𝑙 ≡
𝑝𝛼𝑙 and 𝜇𝑠 ≡ 𝑝𝛼𝑠 , an individual with preferences 𝐯 ≡ (𝑣𝑙 , 𝑣𝑠 ) and reputational
motivations 𝛍 ≡ (𝜇𝑙 , 𝜇𝑠 ). Then, individual’s utility maximization problem is
max{(𝑣𝑙 + 𝑣𝑠 𝑠)𝑙 − 𝑐(𝑙 ) + 𝜇𝑙 𝐸 (𝑣𝑙 |𝑙, 𝑠) − 𝜇𝑠 𝐸(𝑣𝑠 |𝑙, 𝑠)}.
𝑙∈𝐿

(3)

The first order condition is
𝑐 ′ (𝑙) = 𝑣𝑙 + 𝑣𝑠 𝑠 + 𝜇𝑙

𝜕𝐸(𝑣𝑙 |𝑙, 𝑠 )
𝜕𝑙

− 𝜇𝑠

𝜕𝐸(𝑣𝑠 |𝑙, 𝑠 )
𝜕𝑙

.

(4)

The individual will choose to contribute l hours of working labor that incurs
the marginal opportunity cost of time 𝑐 ′ (𝑙) to obtain three types of benefits,
representing by the first-three terms of the right-hand side of (4). The first term is the
warm glow from contributing to the common pool resource. The second term is the
yield from the subsidy multiplied by the size of subsidy, which implies that the yield is
an increasing function of the subsidy as long as the subsidy is strictly positive. The
third term represents the marginal benefit of contributing labor to the common pool
resource through reputation when there is no subsidy. The last term is the negative
marginal benefit of contributing labor to the common pool resource through reputation
when there is subsidy. The labor subsidy will crowd in (out) the original contribution
if the first three components on the right-hand side of equation (4) are higher (less)
than the last component.
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We are not able to observe intrinsic and reputational motivation directly. We
infer the types of the individuals based on their degree of intrinsic motivation when no
labor subsidy is offered. With s = 0, we assume that individuals who contribute higher
than the group’s average is more altruistic compared to others and that their
contribution is driven by intrinsic motivation (Jouvet et al., 2000). Altruistic
individuals are unlikely to contribute more when they receive a labor subsidy.
Individuals can also contribute less when there is subsidy due to reputational
motivation, i.e., being viewed as greedy individuals by other members of the group.
However, if the level of subsidy is high enough to offset reputational motivation, labor
subsidy could crowd in intrinsic motivation and lead to a higher level of contribution.
This setting is consistent with Andreoni (1990), which calibrated the impact of
subsidies to a variety of people who possess different levels of altruism and found that
subsidies led to more contributions to public goods by the group that has a higher level
of altruism. We test this hypothesis by examining whether the impact of subsidy
differs based on pro-social attitude, which captures the degree of altruism.
4. Experiment and data
4.1 Study site and recruitment
We conduct this study in the Pangani District in northern coastal Tanzania,
where there is an extensive coastline of mangrove forests. The livelihoods of
households are deeply intertwined with mangrove forests, from its use for fuel and
construction material to providing the fish habitat that supports the artisanal fishery,
which provides cash income to these households (McNally et al., 2011). There is a
socio-ecological relationship between the mangrove forests and fishing communities,
which is the basis of the design of the public goods game as described below.
11

The framed field experiments are conducted in seven subvillages in Pangani
District, which are selected based on the existence of mangrove forests and where
fishing is the predominant livelihood (Figure 1). The chairman of each subvillage
selected 24 participants who are available at the time of the experiment. The
experimenter then assigns the participants to a specific session with one of the two
randomly predetermined sets of treatments. With six participants in each of the 26
sessions, there are a total of 156 participants. Based on descriptive statistics, 87
percent of the subjects are fishers and 43 percent use mangrove trees for extractive
purposes (Table 1). The descriptive statistics of the sample indicate that there were 86
percent of male participants and the average age is 40. The year of schooling is 5,
which is about the primary education. Around 66 percent of the participants have
volunteering experience in forest planting. The average income normalized by
household size is 84,484 Tanzanian Shilling per month, or around 36 US dollar.
4.2 Experimental design
Structure
The experiment is designed based on the public goods game tailored to reflect
the socioecological relationships between mangrove forest ecosystem and the local
community (Figure 2). The participants privately allocate their labor hours for fishing
(private good) or for planting mangrove trees (public good). The benefit from fishing
is the direct income, while the benefit from mangrove forest is indirect income
through its enhanced function as a fish habitat. The increased fish habitat results in a
greater number of fish harvest, leading to higher private benefit for everyone. The
experiment is a repeated game, consisting of six rounds. The participants accumulate
12

income from fishing in each round. The income is summed across rounds, converted
into Tanzania shilling and paid to the subjects at the end of the session.
Specifically, the experiment is proceeded as follows. Each subject is endowed
with 10 tokens at the start of each round. Each token, each human-shaped paper card
represents one working hour (Figure 3). In each round, the subjects privately decide on
how many out of ten hours to allocate to either fishing or planting activity, which they
privately reveal by placing the tokens into two bowls in front of them. The total group
contribution towards planting activity determines how many mangrove trees will
grow, represented by wooden tree tokens, which is shown by the experimenter in front
of all the group members. After the group contribution is revealed, the experimenter
distributes fish tokens to each participant based on the number of fish they earn from
allocating working hours in fishing activity. A full script of the experiment is shown in
Appendix I.
Functional form of incentives faced by the participants
There are several interdependencies between the participant’s labor allocation,
fishing income, and the number of mangrove trees. The fishing harvest function we
use is a modified Schaefer model:

𝑓

1

2

𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 0.1(𝐿𝑖𝑡 )5 (𝐹𝑖𝑡 )3 ,
where H is the harvest volume, Lf is labor hours in fishing, F is the fish stock size, and
i and t subscripts denote individual and experiment round, respectively. Harvest, and
hence the income, is affected by both the labor input and the size of fish stock. The
fish stock size is assumed as
13

𝐹𝑡 = 0.7(𝑀𝑡 ),
where M is the total number of mangrove trees. In this experiment, we assign
2
𝑀𝑡 = 5 + (0.15(𝐿𝑚
𝑖𝑡 )) ,

where 𝐿𝑚
𝑖𝑡 is the labor hours input for mangrove tree planting by individual i in round t.
Lastly, the total payoff yielding from the harvest function defined above is given by
TZS = 450(∑6𝑡=1 𝐻𝑖𝑡 ),
where TZS is the Tanzania shilling.
Behavioral strategies
With the above set up, there are a few factors a subject needs to consider when
making the decision of how many hours of labor to allocate between fishing and tree
planting. There is a tangible opportunity cost of allocating an additional hour to tree
planting, which is the reduction in fishing income. The subject could benefit from tree
planting through fish stock enhancement and subsequent increase in harvest; however,
this benefit pathway has Prisoner’s Dilemma structure: the best outcome is when
everyone puts a few labor hours to planting, but an individual can obtain a higher
payoff if she free-rides on others planting effort. If everyone tries to free-ride on
others, however, then no mangrove trees will be planted, negatively affecting the fish
stock, and everyone is worse off. Given that our experiment has multiple rounds, i.e.,
it is a repeated game, the question is whether the Folk Theorem would sufficiently
shift the Nash equilibrium from the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s to something closer to the
social optimum. In the first round, the subjects can estimate the group’s contribution
14

by observing the number of trees; but they cannot know precisely who contributed
how many hours towards the planting activity.
4.3 Treatments
We follow Handberg and Angelsen (2019) to assign different level of subsidies
and D’Adda (2011) and Lopez et al. (2012) to shape social nudges treatment. The
treatments consist of two levels of subsidies and three types of social nudges, which
are grouped into two sets for treatment balance. Each set has six combinations of
treatments, with one combination employed in each of the six rounds (Table 2). The
order of the treatments is randomized in each session of the experiment to avoid the
order bias.
Subsidies
The subsidies are in the form of working hours for mangrove tree planting,
provided externally (henceforth labor subsidy). In our experimental setting, labor
subsidy, a type of in-kind subsidies, is a more appropriate form of incentive to elicit
subjects’ willingness to contribute time to mangrove planting compared to a financial
subsidy. This is because the subjects may consider a financial subsidy as a wage for
the time that they contribute, which is unlikely to invoke intrinsic motivation to
contribute time for mangrove planting in their communities.
The labor subsidies have two levels, low and high. The low subsidy offers an
additional 25 percent more working hours to the group’s total contribution to
mangrove tree planting, while the high subsidy offers an additional 75 percent more
working hours. All sessions include the low subsidy treatment, but the high subsidy
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treatment is only included in half (or 13) sessions, resulting in a total 78 subjects
taking the high subsidy treatment (Table A1). 5
Social nudges
Following the theoretical framework and the literature, we test three types of
social nudges: revelation of the social norm, recognition, and shaming. In the social
norm treatment, the experimenter provides information on the average number of
hours in mangrove planting contributed by other subjects from the most recent session.
This information is used as a proxy for the community’s social norm and is given to
the group before they make a decision in the specific round. For the recognition
treatment, the experimenter informs the subjects before they make a decision that the
person who contribute the highest number of hours will be recognized by announcing
their names to the group at the end of the round. At the end of the round, the
experimenter counts contribution by each subject privately and then announces the
names in front of the group. For the shaming treatment, the experimenter informs the
subjects prior to making their decisions that everyone will be asked to declare their
contributions to the group at the end of the round. These three social nudge treatments
are employed in 13 sessions involving 78 subjects (Table A1).
5. Empirical strategy
Following previous framed field experiment studies (e.g., Travers et al., 2011;
Vollan et al., 2013; Kaczan et al., 2019), we employ a random effect model to estimate
the treatment effects (Wooldridge, 2013). This model utilizes the panel structure of the

5

Since we need to test three types of social nudges, the groups which include recognition and sharing
are combined with low level of subsidy only to balance the number of treatments.
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experiment data and is also suitable given that the dependent variable, the willingness
to contribute, exhibits a normal distribution6 (Figure A1). The random effect model fits
well with this type of data because it deals with explanatory variables which have the
property of hierarchical randomization (Lindley, 2015).7
To analyze the effects of subsidies and social nudges on willingness to
contribute time to mangrove planting, the empirical model is as follows:
9

𝑊𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑗 + ∑

𝛽1𝑘 𝑇𝑖𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,

𝑘=1

where WTCit is the number of working hours contributed to planting by individual i in
round t. As Model 1, we estimate the vector of treatment effects (𝛽1𝑘 ) where Tikt is a
vector of the dummy variables of the treatment combination k that individual i
received in round t. The treatments include: 1) low level of subsidy, 2) high level of
subsidy, 3) recognition, 4) shaming, 5) social norm, 6) low level of subsidy with
recognition, 7) low level of subsidy with shaming, 8) low level of subsidy with social
norm, and 9) high level of subsidy with social norm. In model 2, we add Ri, a vector of
subjects’ characteristics related to their roles as resource users of individual i,
composed of fisher (whether or not the individual engages in fishery) and mangrove
user (whether or not the individual utilizes mangroves for at least one of the following
purposes: firewood for cooking, building homes, building boat masts, gathering plants

6

The willingness to contribute variable has skewness = -0.11 and kurtosis = 2.40
The random effect model is preferred over the fixed effect model. In our experiment, we randomize
the assignment and the order of the treatment in each session and hence the treatments do not correlate
with the outcome variables through unobservable attributes of the subject. Therefore, we do not need to
control for unobservable characteristics through subject fixed effects. Results from the Hausman test
suggests that the random effect model is preferred over the fixed effect model (Table A2).
7
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for food, medicinal or cultural/religious purposes, making charcoal, and cutting
mangroves for someone else and receive wage for labor.)
In model 3, we add Ai, a vector of variables capturing pro-social personalities
toward the environment of individual i. Adapting Voors et al. (2011), we include
volunteer (a binary indicator of volunteering experience in public forest planting in the
past five years), and attitude: (an average self-report scores of pro-social attitudes; see
Table A4 in Appendix). Finally, in model 4, we add Xi, a vector of demographics
including income, age, gender, education, and household size. εi is the error term.
6. Results
Overall, we find that subsidies were as effective as social nudges in motivating
collective actions, but some combinations between subsidies and social nudges led to
lower willingness to contribute (Table 3, models (1) to (4)). The average willingness
to contribute (in number of hours) to public planting was 5.52 hours (Table 4). The
baseline, which was the first round of every session, had the lowest number of
contributions at 5.10 hours.8 The numbers of average labor contributions in all
treatments in subsequent rounds were higher than the baseline. The average labor
contribution to the public good was the largest with the ‘high subsidy’ treatment,
where the average was 6.10 hours, followed by the ‘social norm’ treatment with an
average of 5.72 hours. Among all of the treatments, ‘low subsidy’ had the lowest mean
of 5.38 hours, or about 20 minutes lower than ‘high subsidy’.

8

This baseline was used as proxy in the social norm treatment because it solely depended on the
willingness to contribute of the subjects without any incentives.
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We tested for statistical significance of the changes in mean contributions
when moving from the baseline to each treatment, and from the subsidies-only
treatments to the combination of subsidies and social nudges (Table 5). The two
largest and statistically significant increases in contributions were from the baseline to
the ‘high subsidy’ treatment and from the baseline to ‘recognition’. With ‘high
subsidy’, the subjects contributed 0.72 hours (about 43 minutes) more on average
compared to the baseline. With ‘recognition’, the subjects contributed 0.71 hours
(about 43 minutes) more compared to the baseline. In addition, we observed a
statistically significant increase in contribution changing from the baseline to
‘shaming’, which was 0.6 hours (about 36 minutes) higher than the baseline. The
change from ‘high subsidy’ to ‘high subsidy with social norm’, in contrast, led to a
decrease in the contribution by 0.65 hours, or 39 minutes. This result was likely a
signal of crowding out effect to intrinsic motivation when the two extrinsic
motivations were combined.
Using random effects model, we find that the labor subsidy and the nudges
independently lead to more contribution compared to the baseline (Table 3). For all of
the variables, a positive (negative) coefficient indicates more (less) contribution to the
public good compared to the baseline, i.e., crowding in (out) intrinsic motivation. The
‘social norm’ treatment motivated the subjects to contribute between 0.50 to 0.52
hours (30 to 31 minutes) more to the public planting. Given the baseline mean
contribution of 5.1 hours, these coefficients imply an increase of 9.8% to 10.2% from
the mean. Other social nudges, i.e., ‘recognition’ and ‘shaming’, also motivated people
to contribute more to the public. While ‘recognition’ increased the contribution by
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0.68 to 0.70 hours (41 to 42 minutes), ‘shaming’ increased the contribution slightly
more by 0.72 to 0.74 hours (43 to 44 minutes).
In comparison to the subsidies, social nudges led to more contribution than
‘low subsidy’, but less than ‘high subsidy’ in motivating public contribution. The
‘high subsidy’ treatment nearly doubled the contribution compared to the social norm
treatment, on average by 1.11 to 1.14 hours (about 1 hour and 7 minutes to 1 hour and
8 minutes). Still, only the differences between the estimated coefficients of high
subsidy and low subsidy, and between high subsidy and social norm are statistically
significant at p<0.1 level (Table 6). The coefficients for low subsidy and social norm
are statistically equivalent.
However, when the subsidies are interacted with social nudges, they have
negative effects on the public contribution, indicating a crowd-out effect (Models (1)
through (4)). Although not all of them were statistically significant, all coefficient
signs were negative. The two combinations which were consistently statistically
significant were ‘high subsidy with social norm’ and ‘low subsidy with shaming’. The
‘low subsidy with shaming’ decreased contributions by 0.898 hours (54 minutes) on
average, whereas the ‘high subsidy with social norm’ lowered the contribution as
much as 1.415 hours (or 1 hour and 25 minutes).
Estimated coefficients on subject characteristics were largely insignificant
(Table A3). This includes coefficients of the status of a ‘fisher’ and a ‘mangrove user’,
as well as their past experience in volunteering in forest planting and the score of prosocial attitude (Models 2, 3 and 4). Among other characteristics, ‘log of income per
capita’ was positive and statistically significant, indicating that subjects with higher
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incomes tended to contribute more to the public planting. Gender (=1 if female) was
negative and significant, most likely reflecting the fact that fishing is a maledominated livelihood while women are usually involved in fish processing (e.g.,
drying) and selling. Hence, they might have more preference towards receiving direct
fish income.
7. Discussion and Conclusions
We tested the crowding effects of intervening subsidies and social nudges
toward intrinsic motivation in public planting through a framed field experiment in
fishing communities in Tanzania. The estimated results suggest that subsidies crowd
in, or complement intrinsic motivation, making the contributions to the public planting
to be higher. Social nudges also worked as well as the subsidies to motivate public
contributions. In particular, we found that the effects of social nudges were
comparable to the subsidy, in particular ‘shaming’ and ‘recognition’. While
‘recognition’ could be considered as a reward, ‘shaming’ could be considered as a
punishment where the strategy is to avoid being the lowest. This finding is consistent
with the concept of loss aversion. These outcomes are consistent with Sigmund et al.
(2001) and Choi and Ahn (2013) who found that punishment are more effective in
motivating pro-social behavior in the public goods game.
Nevertheless, when subsidy was combined with a social nudge, we found some
evidence of crowding out of intrinsic motivation. Specifically, we found a crowdingout effect when ‘high subsidy’ was combined with ‘social norm’. A reason could be
that the information on the average amount of contributions from the previous session
made the subjects to form an expectation that significant amounts of contribution were
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likely to be made. Individuals may exploit the high level of subsidy when they were
informed that other individuals in the group would contribute a significant amount.
The combination of ‘low subsidy’ and ‘shaming’ also crowded out intrinsic
motivation. This outcome might be reflecting the reputational effect (Benabou and
Tirole 2006), which is the notion that individuals do not want others to think that they
were greedy and only motivated by subsidies to contribute to the public. Therefore,
they tended to contribute less than their original levels when they received subsidies
and their number of contributions was revealed.
Combined, these results imply that social nudges may be preferred over
subsidies. While the subsidies by themselves could positively affect intrinsic
motivation, the naive implementation of subsidies could generate unintended
outcomes. For example, when the subsidies were implemented in the areas where
there was a strong social norm among the members of the community or when the
level of subsidies and the names of the individuals who gained subsidies were
disclosed, the subsidies could fail to promote collective action and could even worsen
the collective action by crowding out intrinsic motivation of the community’s
members. We suggest that future research test plausible crowding-out effects from
other types of extrinsic motivation or incentives such as the subsidies in foods or
fishing or agricultural equipment. They give more direct benefit to the households, but
deteriorate the feeling of being hired to volunteer to the public work.
.
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Figure 1 Study site in Pangani District, Tanzania
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Figure 2 Diagram used in the experiment to show the relationship between humans,
mangroves, and fish population
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Figure 3 A human card (upper), tree token (middle), and fish card (bottom)
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Income per capita (TZS)

84,484

131,298

0

1,200,000

Age

40.22

12.6

18

77

Gender (1=male)

0.86

0.35

0

1

Education (Year)

5.62

3.69

0

16

Household size

5.11

2.33

1

16

Number of relatives playing in same
session

0.94

1.2

0

5

Number of people interacting regularly
who played in the same session

4.46

1.21

0

5

Fisher (1=Yes)

0.87

0.34

0

1

Mangrove user (1=Yes)

0.43

0.5

0

1

Have experience volunteering in forest
planting (1=Yes)

0.66

0.48

0

1

Pro-social attitude

4.255

0.76

1

5

Notes: 1. There are 156 observations. 2. 1 USD is around 2,330 TZS (Tanzanian Shilling). 3. Pro-social
attitude index is an average of self-report scores in pro-social behavior toward natural resource,
environment, and society; refer to Table A4
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Table 2 Treatments in the experiment

Subsidy

Social norm

SET 1
No
Yes

Low
High
Low subsidy
High subsidy
no social norm no social norm
Low subsidy
High subsidy
with social norm with social norm

Subsidy

SET 2
None

Revelation

None
No subsidy
no social norm
No subsidy
with social norm

Recognition
Shaming

None

Low

No subsidy

Low subsidy

no revelation

no revelation

No subsidy

Low subsidy

with recognition with recognition
No subsidy

Low subsidy

with shaming

with shaming
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Table 3 Random effect model estimates of number of hours contributed to tree planting
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Low subsidy
0.691*
0.684*
0.679*
0.681*
(0.367)
(0.366)
(0.365)
(0.367)
High subsidy
1.140***
1.125***
1.113***
1.118***
(0.416)
(0.413)
(0.411)
(0.416)
Social norm
0.520**
0.509*
0.500*
0.504*
(0.262)
(0.263)
(0.262)
(0.261)
Recognition
0.681**
0.692**
0.701**
0.697**
(0.329)
(0.324)
(0.322)
(0.316)
Shaming
0.721***
0.732***
0.741***
0.737***
(0.271)
(0.268)
(0.266)
(0.265)
Low subsidy and social norm
-0.481
-0.475
-0.469
-0.471
(0.445)
(0.445)
(0.444)
(0.444)
High subsidy and social norm
-1.415***
-1.400***
-1.388*** -1.393***
(0.526)
(0.526)
(0.525)
(0.522)
Low subsidy and recognition
-0.658
-0.651
-0.646
-0.648
(0.513)
(0.514)
(0.515)
(0.518)
Low subsidy and shaming
-0.898*
-0.892*
-0.886*
-0.889*
(0.464)
(0.463)
(0.463)
(0.465)
Round fixed effect
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Resource use
Pro-social experience and attitude
No
No
Yes
Yes
Household characteristics
No
No
No
Yes
Constant
5.103***
4.962***
5.066***
2.113
(0.219)
(0.586)
(1.542)
(2.128)
Number of observations
936
936
936
936
Number of groups
156
156
156
156
Wald chi2 test
35.89
40.47
107.55
1017.67
Notes: 1. Household characteristics included income, age, gender, year of education, and household size. 2. Robust
standard error clustered at the group level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 3. Full results are presented in
Table A3
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Table 4 Average contributions by treatment (hours)
Treatment
All observations
Baseline
Low subsidy
High subsidy
Social norm
Recognition
Shaming

Mean
5.52
5.10
5.38
6.10
5.72
5.53
5.58
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SD
2.154
2.020
2.163
2.068
2.209
2.202
2.048

N
936
156
156
78
78
78
78
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APPENDICES

Figure A1 Distribution of willingness to contribute (N = 936)
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Table A1 Number of sessions and participants by treatment
Treatments
Low subsidy
High subsidy
Social norm
Recognition
Shaming

Sessions
26
13
13
13
13
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Participants
156
78
78
78
78

Table A2 Hausman test of fixed effect and random effect
Coefficients

Low subsidy
High subsidy
Social norm
Recognition
Shaming
Low subsidy and social norm
High subsidy and social norm
Low subsidy and recognition
Low subsidy and shaming

Test:

sqrt(diag(V_b(b)
(B)
(b-B)
V_B))
Fixed Random Difference
S.E.
0.317
0.442
-0.125
0.056
0.689
0.814
-0.125
0.056
0.276
0.276
0.000
0.734
0.609
0.125
0.056
0.785
0.660
0.125
0.056
-0.083
-0.083
0.000
-0.929
-0.929
0.000
-0.237
-0.237
0.000
-0.494
-0.494
0.000
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from
xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho;
obtained from xtreg
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 4.67
Prob>chi2 =
0.8624
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
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Table A3 Random effect model estimation of number of contributions
Variable
Low subsidy
High subsidy
Social norm
Recognition
Shaming
Low subsidy and social norm
High subsidy and social norm
Low subsidy and recognition
Low subsidy and shaming

(1)
0.691*
(0.367)
1.140***
(0.416)
0.520**
(0.262)
0.681**
(0.329)
0.721***
(0.271)
-0.481
(0.445)
-1.415***
(0.526)
-0.658
(0.513)
-0.898*
(0.464)

(2)
0.684*
(0.366)
1.125***
(0.413)
0.509*
(0.263)
0.692**
(0.324)
0.732***
(0.268)
-0.475
(0.445)
-1.400***
(0.526)
-0.651
(0.514)
-0.892*
(0.463)
0.307
(0.559)
-0.295
(0.237)

(3)
0.679*
(0.365)
1.113***
(0.411)
0.500*
(0.262)
0.701**
(0.322)
0.741***
(0.266)
-0.469
(0.444)
-1.388***
(0.525)
-0.646
(0.515)
-0.886*
(0.463)
0.234
(0.557)
-0.313
(0.244)
0.364
(0.285)
-0.064
(0.358)

5.103***
(0.219)
936
156
35.89

4.962***
(0.586)
936
156
40.47

5.066***
(1.542)
936
156
107.55

Fisher (1=Yes)
Mangrove user (1=Yes)
Forest planting volunteer (1=Yes)
Pro-social attitude (score: 1-5)
Log of income per capita
Age
Age2
Female (1=Yes)
Education
Household size
Constant
Number of observations
Number of groups
Wald chi2 test

(4)
0.681*
(0.367)
1.118***
(0.416)
0.504*
(0.261)
0.697**
(0.316)
0.737***
(0.265)
-0.471
(0.444)
-1.393***
(0.522)
-0.648
(0.518)
-0.889*
(0.465)
-0.374
(0.461)
-0.383
(0.241)
0.370
(0.276)
-0.297
(0.349)
0.278*
(0.142)
0.091*
(0.052)
-0.001*
(0.001)
-0.713
(0.446)
-0.061**
(0.030)
0.024
(0.034)
2.113
(2.128)
936
156
1017.67

Notes: 1. Robust standard error clustered at the group level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 2. Round fixed
effect is included in model (1)-(4)
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Table A4 Pro-social attitude
Statement

Mean

SD

4.391

0.713

4.417

0.543

4.397

0.574

A person who believes in the fair treatment of all
people, including persons who are unknown to them.

3.929

1.093

A person who will give a part of income to protect
degradation in mangrove forest

4.103

0.818

A person who will give a part of labor to protect
degradation and restore mangrove forest

4.436

0.718

A person whose companions help out in public works

4.109

0.860

A person who believes that everyone must look after
the environment.
A person who respects the environment and believes
that we should live in harmony with other living
beings.
A person who believes it is important to help others
around them.

Note: The question is "In your view, how much does each of these represent you?" 1 = Not
at all like me, 2 = Not like me, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Like me, and 5 = Very much like me
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Appendix I: Example of enumerator’s script
Instructions
Thank you for participating and welcome to our research project. Today we are
asking you to play what we are calling “mangrove planting and fishing game.” In this
game, you will be asked to make a series of decisions about how to allocate your time
(hours) among different activities. There will be 12 decisions to make; each of them
may be subject to different rules. The facilitators will inform you about the rules that
apply at the beginning of the round, so please listen to the facilitator carefully for your
best benefit. Your decision, and those of others, will determine your overall
performance in this game and be converted to cash payment at the end of this session.
This is the cash for you to take home.
Here is a quick overview of what you will be doing. You are given 10 working
hours for each decision you make. Your task is to decide the number of hours to go
fishing, and number of hours to plant mangrove trees in your village’s mangrove
forest. The total must add up to 10 hours (no leisure!). Facilitator will collect your
decisions and do the following calculations. First, the facilitator will add up
everyone’s hours allocated for mangrove tree planting. This will determine how much
your group’s mangrove forest stand will increase, which will then determine how
much the fish stock will increase. Second, this fish stock level and the number of
hours you allocated for fishing will determine your individual harvest. You will make
this decision 12 times, and your total earnings (total number of fish you harvested)
will be converted to actual cash payment you will receive at Tsh750 per fish.
Note the trade-off involved. You will earn more for yourself if you allocate
more hours for fishing. But if you allocate hours to mangrove tree planting, it will
increase the fishing productivity for everyone in your group, that is, the number of fish
caught per hour of fishing. Therefore, your fishing harvest can increase by either more
fishing hours or more fish stock through mangrove planting. Note, however, that
benefit from mangrove planting depends on the group’s total number of hours
allocated for planting: the sum of yours and others.
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Also note that each round will begin with five (5) stands of mangrove trees. No
matter how much growth your group has achieved in previous round, the size of
mangrove forest will reset to five stands of trees. Thus, each round is a fresh start
every time.
In summary, you will earn income from the fish you catch. How much you can
catch depends on fishing hours and the size of the fish stock, which in turn depends on
the size of mangrove stands in your group. The larger your group’s mangrove forests,
the more fish habitat it provides, and therefore your group will have more fish stock.
But this means some hours must be allocated away from fishing and into tree planting.
And it is the total hours in your group that matters for the forest, not just your
allocated hours.
------------------------QUIZ
Now, we will ask you a few quiz questions to make sure you understood the basic
structure of this game.
1. (Using/showing the actual tokens) Which of the following is not a correct way
of allocating your 10 hours of work? I will give four options; please raise your
hand if you think the statement is not a correct way of allocating 10 hours of
your work.
a. 5 hours for fishing, 5 hours for tree planting (pause and see if anyone
raises his hand).
b. 10 hours for fishing, 0 hours for tree planting (ditto).
c. 3 hours for fishing, 2 hours for tree planting (ditto).
d. 3 hours for fishing, 7 hours for tree planting (ditto).
The answer is (c), “3 hours for fishing, 2 hours for tree planting”, because the
total hours do not add up to 10.
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(*if necessary, emphasize that allocating zero hours to one activity is perfectly
fine as long as all 10 hours are allocated to the other activity, i.e., the total of
the two activities add up to 10 hours = all tokens are allocated.)
2. If you allocate all 10 hours to mangrove planting, will you make money from
that round? Yes or No?
The answer is No, because unless you go for fishing and catch fish you will not
make any money.
(*if necessary, emphasize that tree planting does not generate earning directly;
it only contributes to more earning indirectly through fish stock size growth.
So you must fish to earn anything.)
3. Which one of the following two situations will YOU make more money?
a. You allocate 9 hours for fishing, others also allocate 9 hours each for
fishing.
b. You allocate 9 hours for fishing, but others allocated just 2 hours each
for fishing.
(a) or (b)? (let participants speak up, or ask them to raise hand)
The answer is (b).
In (b), everyone else spent 8 hours each on tree planting (thus, only 2 hours
each for fishing), so mangrove forest grew by a lot and fish stock got bigger.
Then, you spent 9 hours fishing, so you must have caught a lot of fish.
In (a), everyone, including you, put very little hours in tree planting. Forest did
not grow by much, and so the fish stock did not increase much. You spent the
same 9 hours fishing, but will not catch as much as in (b) because the fish
stock size is smaller.
(*this is important; make sure everyone understand the answer.)
4. Once again, which one of the following two situations will YOU make more
money?
a. You allocate 9 hours for fishing, others also allocate 9 hours each for
fishing.
b. You allocate 2 hours for fishing, others also allocate 2 hours each for
fishing.
(a) or (b)? (let participants speak up, or ask them to raise hand)
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This is a trick question; the answer is “we cannot tell” without more
information.
(a) is the same as the previous question: everyone is spending less time
planting mangrove, thus fish stock size is smaller. So, despite everyone is
fishing for many hours, the catch will be relatively small.
In (b), everyone, including you, are spending many hours planting mangrove
trees. Forest will grow larger, and fish stock size will increase. But you are
spending only 2 hours in fishing. So even though the fish stock is larger, we do
not know if the catch will be larger than (a).
(*this is also important; make sure everyone understand the answer.)
5. Once last time, which one of the following two situations will YOU make
more money?
a. You allocate 6 hours for fishing.
b. You allocate 4 hours for fishing.
These are the only information you have. (a) or (b)? (let participants speak up,
or ask them to raise hand)
The answer is once again “we cannot tell” without more information.
As demonstrated in quizzes #3 and #4, unless we know, at minimum, what the
others have chosen to do we cannot tell with certainty which option gives you
the higher earning.
(*this is to re-re-emphasize that your decision as well as those of others are
critical for the end results.)

Does anyone have any questions about this game?
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PRACTICE ROUND
We will now do a practice round. In front of you are 10 tokens shaped like a
person. Each token represents one working hour, so you are starting with 10 working
hours. Your task is to divide the 10 hours between going fishing and planting
mangrove trees in your village’s mangrove forest by placing the tokens on the two
bowls in front of you. In the white bowl, put the number of tokens equal to the number
of hours you decide to contribute to mangrove planting. In the blue bowl, put the
number of tokens equal to the number of hours you decide to spend on fishing.
Remember, the total must add up to 10 hours.
At the end of each round, the facilitators will collect the bowls from each
member. Then, the facilitators will calculate the number of fish you have caught, and
return your tokens of fish according to your catch. As mentioned previously, at the end
of this game, the total number of fish that you have caught will be converted into cash
for Tsh 750 per fish.

This is a practice round; the fish you catch during this round will not count
towards the final earning.

In this practice round, you will decide how to allocate your 10 working hours
between fishing and mangrove planting. Your decision should be kept secret from
other members in your group. We will also not reveal your contribution to the group at
any point during this round. Make sure to refrain from talking to each other.

(Make sure everyone is ready)

Please begin.
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SET [1]
We will now start the actual game. Please pay attention to the rules that apply.
STOP

Round A
In this round, you will allocate your 10 hours between two activities: fishing and
mangrove planting.
Your decision should be kept private (secret), so please refrain from talking to each
other or show your bowls.
STOP

Round B
In this round, the government or NGOs will help your group’s mangrove tree planting
effort.
Specifically, for every hour you put into mangrove planting, the government or NGOs
will add additional 1/4 hours, or 15 minutes, to the group.
For example, if the total hours for tree planting from everyone in your group is 20
hours, the government or NGOs will add another 5 hours, making the grand total of 25
hours for planting mangrove trees. Think of this as the government or NGOs are
sending their people to help your group’s planting effort for free for 5 hours.

Round C
In this round, the government or NGOs will help your group’s mangrove tree planting
effort.
Specifically, for every hour you put into mangrove planting, the government or NGOs
will add additional 3/4 hours, or 45 minutes, to the group.
For example, if the total hours for tree planting from everyone in your group is 20
hours, the government or NGOs will add another 15 hours, making the grand total of
35 hours in planting mangrove trees. Think of this as the government or NGOs are
sending their people to help your group’s planting effort for free for 15 hours.
STOP

Round D
In this round, your group is solely responsible for planting mangrove trees. There will
be no outside help.
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We would like to inform you that, according to previous sessions we conducted in this
area, the average hours contributed for mangrove planting was about_____ hours.
STOP

Round E
In this round, please pay attention to the following TWO information.
First, we would like to inform you that, according to previous sessions we conducted
in this area, the average hours contributed for mangrove planting was about_____
hours.
Second, in this round the government or NGOs will help your group’s mangrove tree
planting effort.
Specifically, for every hour you put into mangrove planting, the government or NGOs
will add additional 1/4 hours, or 15 minutes, to the group.
For example, if the total hours for tree planting from everyone in your group is 20
hours, the government or NGOs will add another 5 hours, making the grand total of 25
hours in planting mangrove trees. Think of this as the government or NGOs are
sending their people to help your group’s planting effort for free for 5 hours.
STOP

Round F
In this round, please pay attention to the following TWO information.
First, we would like to inform you that, according to previous sessions we conducted
in this area, the average hours contributed for mangrove planting was about_____
hours.
Second, in this round the government or NGOs will help your group’s mangrove tree
planting effort.
Specifically, for every hour you put into mangrove planting, the government or NGOs
will add additional 3/4 hours, or 45 minutes, to the group.
For example, if the total hours for tree planting from everyone in your group is 20
hours, the government or NGOs will add another 15 hours, making the grand total of
35 hours in planting mangrove trees. Think of this as the government or NGOs are
sending their people to help your group’s planting effort for free for 15 hours.
STOP
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Appendix II: Survey questionnaire
SURVEY VERSION 01
Research on Poverty Traps and Mangrove Ecosystem Services in Tanzania
Utafiti kuhusu mtego wa umaskini na huduma za misitu ya mikoko nchini Tanzania
University of Rhode Island | July 2018
PARTICIPANT QUESTIONNAIRE / DODOSO LA WASHIRIKI
Instructions to the enumerator / Maelekezo kwa karani:
The respondent must complete the whole session of experiment. Please find a private
location for the interviews to ensure confidentiality.
In this survey, a “household” is defined as a unit of family sharing food in a single shelter.
Please use the consent form to explain the survey to the respondents.
The black triangle (►) means “if choosing this answer, skip to the specified section”.
Wahojiwa ni lazima wamalize kipengele chote cha zoezi. Tafadhali tafuta sehemu ya
faragha kwa ajilia ya mahojiano ili kulinda usiri.
Katika utafiti huu, Kaya itafsiriwa kama familia moja inayoshirikiana chakula na makazi.
Tafadhali tumia fomu ya makubaliano kuwaelezea wahojiwa kuhusu utafiti
Pembetatu nyeusi (►) ina maana “ikiwa umechagua jibu hili, ruka hadi kipengele
kilichoainishwa”.

Interviewer/Karani
Name/ Jina:_________
Date/Tarehe: ________

A1

Checked by / imepitiwa
Name/Jina: _________
Date/Tarehe: ____-__

Encoded by:
Name/Jina:_____________
Date/Tarehe:____________

A2

Subject ID [this must be the same as in the experiment]
Anuani ya somo (ID) [hii ni lazima ifanane na ile ya zoezi] ___________
Village / Kijiji______________________________

A3

Sub-village / Kitongoji ___________________________

A4

Name of household head /Jina la mkuu wa kaya ________________________

A5

Is the respondent household head? / Je, mhojiwani mkuu wa kaya?
1=yes/Ndio ►next section/Kipengele kinachofuata 2=no/Hapana

A6a

Name of the respondent / Jina la mhojiwa _____________________________
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A6b

Relationship of the respondent to household head/Mahusiano ya mhojiwa kwa
mkuu wa kaya
1=spouse/Mke

2=other (specify) /Nyingine (Elezea): _______________

SECTION X: EXPERIMENT / Jaribio
X0.
How clear were the instructions to you in the experiment you just participated?
/Jinsi gani maelekezo ya zoezi uliloshiriki yamekua fasaha?
1=very clear/Fasaha sana
2=not very clear/Sio fasaha sana
3=did not understand at all/Sijaelewa kabisa
X1.
How many people in your group were members of your family (including
relatives?) /Watu wangapi katika kundi lenu ni miongoni mwa familia yako (ikiwemo
ndugu?)____________________________
X2.

How many people in your group do you interact with regularly? /

Watua wangapi katika kundi lenu mnakutana mara kwa mara? _____________

X3. Our research project will be hosting a “Mangrove Planting Day” within the next
two to three months this year in your village to restore mangrove forest. This project
will be a collaboration with Sea Sense and Ambakofi, two nonprofit conservation
organizations.
The planting activities will take place in several subvillages, including yours, but only
if we get volunteers from your community to help with the activity. If you volunteer
your time, you will be asked to help with preparing mangrove seedlings and planting
them. The project staff will teach you how to prepare the seedlings and plant in
appropriate places. The more volunteer time we get from you and other members of
the community, the more seedlings we can plant. More mangrove trees means more
benefits for your community such as habitat for fish and wildlife.
Mradi wetu wa utafiti utaandaa “siku ya upandaji mikoko” ndani ya miezi miwili hadi
mitatu ijayo ndani ya mwaka huu katika kijiji chenu ili kurejesha msitu wa mikoko.
Mradi huu utashirikisha taasisi mbili za mazingira zisizotengeneza faida, Sea Sense
na Ambakofi.
Shughuli ya upandaji mikoko itafanyika katika vitongoji kadhaa, ikiwemo kitongoji
chako, lakini tu kama tutapata watu wa kujitolea kusaidia shughuli hii kutoka katika
kjiji chako. Kama utajitolea mda wako, utaombwa kusaidia kuandaa mbegu za mikoko
na kuzipanda.
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Wafanyakazi wa mradi watakufundisha jinsi ya kuandaa mbegu za mikoko na
kuzipanda maeneo stahiki. Upatikanaji wa mda mwingi wa kujitolea kutoka kwako na
wanajamii wengine, ndivyo tutakavyoweza kupanda mbegu nyingi zaidi. Miti mingi
zaidi ya mikoko ina maana ya faida nyingi zaidi kwa jamii yenu, kama vile makazi ya
samaki na wanyama pori.

[Treatment 1] How many hours of your time would you be willing to volunteer to help
with the “Mangrove Planting Day”? Please choose the number of hours between 0 and
10 hours. Please note that if you volunteer, you will be asked to participate in the
activities.
I will contribute______hours
Ni masaa mangapi ya mda wako utakua tayari kujitolea kusaidia siku ya Upandaji
mikoko? Tafadhali chagua idadi ya masaa kati ya 0 na 10. Tafadhali tambua ikiwa
umejitolea, utaombwa kushiriki katika Shughuli.
Nitachangia masaa____________
X4. How confident are you in your answer to the previous question? /Ni kwa
kiwango gani una uhakika na jibu ulilotoa katika swali lililotangulia?
1=very confident/ Uhakika sana
2=somewhat confident/ Uhakika kiasi
3=not confident/ Hakuna uhakika
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SECTION 1: Household Information /Taarifa za kaya
HH1

How many members are in your household? / Kaya yako ina wanakaya
wangapi? _______

HH2

How many children do you have? / Je, una watoto wangapi? ______________

HH3

How long have you lived in this village? / Je, ni kwa mda gani umeishi katika
kijiji hiki?
1= I have lived here my entire life/ Nimeishi hapa maisha yangu yote
2= I have lived here a part of my life _ years/Sehemu ya maisha yangu
nimeishi hapa kwa miaka _____

HH4

What are the three most important sources of income for your household? /
Ni nini vyanzo vyako vitatu muhimu vya kipato kwa ajili ya kaya yako?

Source of income/Chanzo cha kipato

1= primary source/chanzo Kikuu
2 = secondary source/ chanzo cha pili
3 = tertiary source/chanzo cha ziada

Fishing/Uvuvi
Fish trading/Biashara ya samaki
Farming crops/Kilimo cha mazao
Agriculture trading/Biashara ya mazao
ya kilimo
Livestock/Ufugaji
Construction/Ujenzi
Salt production/Uzalishaji chumvi
Hotel or restaurant/Hotel au Mgahawa
Remittance from family members/
Msaada kutoka kwa wanafamilia
Kiosk/food vendors - Kioski/mama ntilie
Teacher/Mwalimu
Bee keeping/Ufugaji nyuki
Other specify/ Nyingine elezea: _______
HH5 During the last month (July 2018) how much was your household's income from
that source (Tanzania Shilling)? / Katika kipindi cha mwezi wa saba 2018, ulikua na
kipato cha kiasi gani kutoka katika chanzo hicho
Primary source! TSH / Chanzo Kikuu shillingi_________
Secondary source! TSH / Chanzo cha pili _________
Tertiary source! TSH / Chanzo cha tatu _________
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SECTION 2: Mangrove Use / Matumizi ya mikoko
MU1 Did you harvest mangroves for the following purpose in the past year?
Je, uliwahi kuvuna mikoko kwa ajili ya matumizi yafuatayo mwaka uliopita?
1 = Yes/Ndio 2 =
No/Hapana
MU1a
MU1b
MU1c
MU1d

MU1e
MU1f

Purpose/Dhumuni
Firewood/Kuni
Building Homes/Kujenga nyumba
Building Boat Masts/Kutengeneza milingoti ya boti
Gathering Plants for Food, Medicinal or
Cultural/Religious Purposes/ Kukusanya mikoko
kwa ajilia ya chakula, dawa au mila/dini
Charcoal/Mkaa
Cutting mangroves for someone else and receive
wage for labor/ Kukata mikoko kwa ajili ya mtu na
kupokea ujira wa nguvu kazi

SECTION 3: Fishing and Shrimping Activities / Shughuli za Uvuvi na ukamataji
kamba
FS1 Please tell us whether you harvested fish for self-consumption or income in the
past year?
FS1 Tafadhali tueleze kama ulivua samaki kwa matumizi binafsi au kipato mwaka
uliopita?
1 = Yes/Ndio 2 =
No/Hapana
FS1a
FS1b
FS1c
FS1d

Purpose/Dhumuni
FISH: Consumption
SAMAKI: Chakula
FISH: Income
SAMAKI: Kipato
SHRIMP: Consumption
KAMBA: Chakula
SHRIMP: Income
KAMBA: Kipato
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SECTION 4: Attitude and Behavior toward Local Public Work and Natural
Resource /
Msimamo na tabia juu ya kazi za kijamii na mali asili
AB1 Have you ever helped out in the following public works for your village in the
past five years? If you had, how many times and total number of days in the last five
years? / Ulishawahi kusaidia kazi za kijamii katika kijiji chako ndani ya miaka tano
iliyopita? [ENUMERATOR: For frequency, please ask for the number of days first
Public works/Shughuli za
umma

1 = Yes/Ndio
2=
No/Hapana

# of
Times /
Idadi
ya
awamu

# of Days
(use 888 if
don’t
remember) /
Idadi ya siku
(tumia namba
888 kama
hukumbuki)

AB1a Forest planting
Upandaji misitu
AB1b Well digging
Kuchimba kisima
AB1c Road constructing
Kutengeneza barabara
AB1d Other 1 specify/ Nyingine 1
elezea:_______________
AB1e Other 2 specify/ Nyingine 1
elezea:
__________________
AB2 [If AB1a Forest Planting = Yes] What are the reasons that you decided to help
out in planting trees in your village? / [Ikiwa AB1a Upandaji misitu = Ndio] Nini
sababu zilizopelekea kusaidia upandaji misitu katika kijiji chenu?
Reasons/Sababu
AB2a
AB2b
AB2c
AB2d

1 = Yes/Ndio
2 = No/Hapana

My friends/neighbors also do
Rafiki yangu/Jirani yangu anafanya pia
My parents/family member also do
Wazazi wangu/wanafamilia wanafanya pia
I was asked to help out
Niliombwa kusaidia
I want natural resources in my village to be in better
condition
Nataka rasilimali asilia ziwe katika hali nzuri katika
kijiji changu
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AB2e
AB2f
AB2g
AB2h
AB2i
AB23j

My income/consumption depend on natural resources
Kipato changu/chakula hutegemea rasilimali asilia
I feel that it is a duty to conserve the natural resources
Nahisi ni wajibu kuhifadhi rasilimali asilia
There are not enough people to complete the work
Hakuna watu wa kutosha wa kufanya kazi hii
I just want to help
Napenda kujitolea tu
I do not have reason/I do not know
Sina sababu/sijui
Other specify /Nyingine elezea:
____________________________________________

AB3 [If AB1a Forest Planting = No] What are the reasons that you decided NOT to
help out in planting the forest in your village? / [Ikiwa AB1a Upandaji misitu =
Hapana] Nini sababu zilizopelekea KUTOSAIDIA upandaji misitu katika kijiji chenu?
Reasons/Sababu

1 = Yes/Ndio 2 =
No/Hapana

AB3a There are a lot of people already volunteering
Kuna watu wengi tayari wanajitolea
AB3b None of my friend/neighbors are in the
volunteering group
Hakuna rafiki yangu/jirani kwenye kikundi cha
wanaojitolea
AB3c I do not have free time
Sina mda huru wa kujitolea
AB3d No one asks me for help
Hakuna aliyeniomba msaada
AB3e There was no public work occurring as much as
I knew
Haijawahi kutokea kazi ya kijamii kwa kadiri
nijuavyo
AB3f I do not have reason/ I do not know
Sina sababu/sijui
AB3g Other specify/ Nyingine eleza:
AB4 How do you think the current condition of mangrove forests in your village be
the best described? [Please read out loud the four categories below] / Unafikiri
utaelezaje kuhusu hali ya sasa ya misitu ya mikoko katika kijijini chenu? [Tafadhali
soma kwa sauti vipengele vinne hapo chini]
1=Excellent quality/ Hali nzuri Sanaa ► AB7
2=Good quality /Hali nzuri

► AB7
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3=Fair quality/ Hali ya kawaida ► AB5 & AB6
4=Poor quality /Hali mbaya ► AB5 & AB6
AB5 In your opinion, what is the cause of fair or poor quality? [Enumerator: DO
NOT READ THE LIST]
Kwa maoni yako, ni nini sababu ya hali ya kawaida na mbaya ya mikoko? [Karani:
USISOME ORODHA]
Causes/Chanzo

1 = Yes/ Ndio
2 = No/Hapana

AB5a Overexploitation by local people
Matumizi makubwa ya wanakijiji
AB5b Overexploitation by people from outside my
village
Matumizi makubwa ya watu kutoka nje ya kijiji
AB5c Natural disaster
Majanga ya asili
AB5d Spiritual action
Shughuli za kiimani
AB5e I do not have an opinion/ I do not know
Sina maoni/sijui
AB5f Other specify/ Nyingine eleza: __________
AB6 What do you think is the most effective way to improve condition of mangrove
forest? [Enumerator: THIS QUESTION IS ONLY IF THEY ANSWERED AB4=3
(fair) or 4 (poor). DO NOT READ THE LIST] / Unafikiri ni njia gani bora zaidi ya
kuboresha hali ya misitu ya mikoko? [Karani: SWALI HILI NI KAMA TU ALIJIBU
KIPENGELE AB4=3 (kawaida) au (mbaya) USISOME ORODHA]
Method/Njia

1=
Yes/Ndio
2=
No/Hapana

AB6a

Participation and cooperation from villagers in planting and
restoring forest
Ushirikiano kutoka kwa wanakijiji katika upandaji na
urejeshaji misitu ya mikoko.
AB6b Reduction in mangrove use among villagers
Kupunguza matumizi ya mikoko miongoni mwa wanakijiji
AB6c Financial aid from government/NGOs to buy substitution of
mangrove
Msaada wa kifedha kutoka serikalini/Taasisi zisizo za
serikali kununua mbadala wa mikoko
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AB6d Labor subsidy from government/NGOs to restore and plant
mangrove
Ruzuku za nguvu kazi kutoka serikalini/Taasisi zisizo za
serikali ili kupanda na kurejesha mikoko
AB6e Aid in the form of alternative energy source or material to
replace mangrove use
Msaada katika mfumo wa vyanzo vya nishati mbadala au
malighafi ili kufidia matumizi ya mikoko
AB6f More strict monitoring in mangrove harvest around the
forest
Uangalizi imara zaidi katika uvunaji mikoko kuzunguka
msitu.
AB6g Other specify/ Nyingine eleza:
________________________________________________
AB7 Do you plan to live in this village for the rest of your life? /
Je una mpango wa kuishi katika kijiji hiki maisha yako yote?
1=yes/Ndio

►AB11

2=no/Hapana ►AB9

3=Don’t know ►AB11

AB8 What are possible reasons that you want to move to somewhere else?
[Enumerator: DO NOT READ THE LIST]
Nini huenda ikawa sababu inayopelekea utake kuhamia sehemu nyingine?
[Karani: USISOME ORODHA]
Reasons/Sababu

1 = Yes/Ndio
2 = No/Hapana

AB9a There are not enough fish and shrimp to make a living
Hakuna samaki na kamba wa kutosha ili kuwezesha
maisha
AB9b The drought becomes too severe
Ukame umekua maradufu
AB9c No job available around here
Hakuna kazi maeneo haya
AB9d I do not have reason/ I do not know
Sina sababu/Sijui
AB9e Other specify/ Nyingine elezea:
________________________________
AB9 Do you already have a plan to move to other places in the future? / Je una
mpango tayari wa kuhamia sehemu nyingine baadae?
1=yes / Ndio / years /Mwaka ______ Months /Mwezi ______
2=no / Hapana
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AB10 Do you wish your children to live and have their own family in this village?
Je unatamani watoto wako waishi na kujenga familia zao katika kijiji hiki?
1=yes/Ndio

3= Don’t know / Sijui

2=no/Hapana

SECTION 5: Personal characteristics and Attitude / Sifa na tabia za mtu
PA1 We now ask you for your willingness to act in a certain way. Please again
indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means “completely unwilling to do
so,” and a 10 means “very willing to do so.” You can also use any number between 0
and 10 to indicate where you fall on the scale, using 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.
Sasa tunakuuliza utayari wako wa kuchukua hatua katika mwenendo Fulani.
Tafadhali onesha jibu lako katika kipimo cha kutoka 0 hadi 10. A 0 maana yake
“hauko tayari kabisa kufanya hivyo” na A 10 maana yake “upo tayari kabisa kufanya
hivyo”. Pia unaweza kutumia namba yoyote kuonyesha wapi upo, ukitumia
0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 au 10
Number between 0 and 10
/ 0 (Sitegemei kufanya hivyo
kabisa) hadi 10 (Nategemea
kufanya hivyo kabisa)
PA1a How willing are you to give up something
that is beneficial for you today in order to
benefit more from that in the future? /
Unatarajia kwa kiasi gani kuacha kitu
fulani ambacho ni cha manufaa kwako leo
kwa ajili ya kunufaika zaidi katika siku
zijazo?
PA1b How willing are you to give to good causes
without expecting anything in return? /
Unatarajia kwa kiasi gani kutoa msaada
kwa wenye matatizo bila kutegemea
kurudishiwa chochote
PA2 How well does the following statement describe you as a person? Please indicate
your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means “does not describe me at all,” and a 10
means “describes me perfectly.” You can use any number between 0 and 10 to
indicate where you fall on the scale, using 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10.
Ni kwa namna gani maelezo yafuatayo yanakuelezea wewe kama mtu? Tafadhali
onesha jibu lako katika kipimo kutoka 0 hadi 10. A 0 maana yake “hayanielezei mimi
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kabisa”, na a 10 maana yake yananielezea mimi sawa sawia”. Unaweza pia kutumia
namba yoyote kuonyesha wapi upo,ukitumia 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 au 10

Number between 0 and 10
/ 0 (Hazinielezei mimi kabisa)
hadi 10 (Zinanielezie mimi
sawa sawa)
PA2

I assume that people have only the best
intentions / Nakisia kwamba watu wana
malengo mazuri tu.

PA3 This question will ask about several brief characterizations that describe certain
personal value traits. In your view, how much does each of these represent you?
Swali hili litauliza kuhusu sifa za imani mbali mbali ambazo zinaelezea sifa za utu wa
mtu. Kwa mtazamo wako, kwa kiwango gani kila sifa moja wapo inakuwakilisha?
Characteristics/sifa

1 = Not at all like
me/sio kama mimi
kabisa
2 = Not like me/sio
kama mimi
3 = Neutral/kati kwa
kati
4 = Like me/kama
mimi
5 = Very much like
me/ni kama mimi
kabisa

PA3a A person who believes that everyone must look
after the environment. / Mtu anayeamini kua kila
mtu ni lazima awe mwangalizi wa mazingira
PA3b A person who respects the environment and
believes that we should live in harmony with other
living beings. / Mtu anayeheshimu mazingira na
kuamini kwamba inabidi tuishi kwa Amani na
watu wengine
PA3c A person who believes it is important to help
others around them. / Mtu anayeamini kua ni
muhimu kusaidia watu wengine wanaokuzunguka
PA3d A person who believes in the fair treatment of all
people, including persons who are unknown to
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them./ Mtu anayeamini usawa kwa watu wote,
ikiwemo watu asiowajua
PA3e A person who makes decisions and likes to be a
leader. / Mtu anayefanya maamuzi na anapenda
kua kiongozi
PA3f A person who believes it is important to have a lot
of money. / Mtu anayeamini kua ni muhimu kua na
pesa nyingi
PA3g A person who believes it is important to have
influence over people and their actions. / Mtu
anayeamini kua ni muhimu kua na ushawishi juu
ya watu wengine na vitendo vyao.
PA3h A person who will give a part of income to protect
degradation in mangrove forest / Mtu unaeweza
kutoa sehemu ya kipato chako ili kulinda uharibifu
wa mazingira
PA3i A person who will give a part of labor to protect
degradation and restore mangrove forest /Mtu
unaeweza kutoa nguvu kazi ili kulinda uharibifu na
urejeshaji wa misitu ya mikoko
PA3j A person whose companions help out in public
works / Mtu mwenye marafiki wanaosaidia katika
Shughuli za kijamii

PA4 This question will ask about your attitude toward the environment. In your view,
how much do you agree on the following statement?
Swali hili litauliza kuhusu tabia yako juu ya mazingira. Kwa mtazamo wako, kwa kiasi
gani unakubaliana na maelezo yafuatayo?

1 = Strongly
disagree/sikubaliani
kabisa
2=
Disagree/sikubaliani
3 = Neutral/kati kwa
kati
4=
Agree/Nakubaliana
5 = Strongly agree/
Nakubaliana sana

Statements / Maelezo
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PA4a

PA4b

PA4c
PA4d

PA4e

PA4f

PA4g

PA4h

PA4i

PA4j

PA4k

PA4l

Environmental degradation is not as bad as people
normally say it is. / Uharibifu wa mazingira sio kitu
kibaya kama ambavyo watu wanasema mara nyingi
If things continue on the current path, we will soon
experience a major natural disaster. /Ikiwa vitu
vitaendelea katika mwelekeo huu wa sasa, hivi
kribuni tutashuhudia Majanga makuu ya asili
Protecting the environment benefits everyone.
/Utunzaji wa mazingira ni faida kwa kila mmoja
Degradation of the environment directly affects my
living condition / Uharibifu wa mazingira umeathiri
hali ya maisha yangu moja kwa moja
Environmental degradation caused in my
neighborhood will often affect people in other parts
of the world. / Uharibifu wa mazingira
unaosababishwa na jirani yangu mara zote utaathiri
watu wengine katika maeneo mengine ya Dunia
In the next 10 years, thousands of animal and plant
species will go extinct. /Miaka 10 ijayo,maelfu ya
aina ya wanyama na mimea watatoweka
Every person is responsible for protecting the
environment. / Kila mtu ana wajibu wa kulinda
mazingira
The government bears the most responsibility for
protecting the
environment. / Serikali inabeba jukumu kuu la
kulinda mazingira
My household is responsible for reducing
environmental degradation /Kaya yangu inawajibika
katika Kupunguza uharibifu wa mazingira
All households are responsible for reducing
environmental degradation. / Kaya zote zinawajibika
Kupunguza katika Kupunguza uharibifu wa
mazingira
I am unwilling to cooperate to reduce environmental
degradation if others do not do same. / Niko tayari
kushirikiana ili Kupunguza uharibifu wa mazingira
kama wengine hawatafanya kama mimi.
I have a moral obligation to protect the environment.
/ Nina jukumu la kimaadili la kulinda mazingira.
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SECTION 6: Respondent Information / Taarifa za mhojiwa
RI1 Respondent’s Gender / Jinsia ya mhojiwa :
1 = Male / mwanaume

2 = Female / Mwanamke

RI2 Respondent’s Age / Umri wa mhojiwa: __________
RI3 What is the highest level of education you received? /
Je una kiwango gani cha juu cha elimu? ____________________
0 No education
Hakuna elimu
1 Some Primary Education
Shule ya msingi kiasi fulani
2 Primary Education (Standard 7)
Shule ya msingi (darasa la 7)
3 Some Secondary Education/ Shule ya
sekondari kiasi Fulani

6

4 Secondary Education Form 4/ Shule ya
sekondari kidato cha 4

10 Others, specify/ Nyingine
elezea________________

7
8
9

College Certificate
Cheti cha chuo
College Diploma
Diploma ya chuo
University Degree
Degree ya chuo
Vocational School/ Shule ya
ufundi

5 Secondary Education Form 6/ Shule ya
sekondari kidato cha 6

FINISHED / MWISHO
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Abstract

Seawater intrusion is a growing pressure in coastal communities worldwide, putting
millions of people at risk of drinking saline water. This study assesses the
vulnerability of two impoverished, coastal regions in Tanzania to salinization of local
drinking water sources and explores two pathways through which salinity can be a
source of chronic poverty. We use integrated data of drinking water wells and
household surveys implemented in 2016–2017. The study period coincided with a
prolonged drought and many wells displayed elevated salinities. The results suggest
that 1) higher level of salinity increases adult health problems taking their time away
from work; and that 2) lower water levels--often associated with high salinity, odor or
lack of clarity-- increases the time households spend collecting water. Overall, the
study finds that these communities have limited sustainable options for adaptation to
drought, implying low resilience to saline drinking water problems in the future.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Salinization of drinking water in coastal areas is a growing global concern,
becoming more severe with drought1-4. Excess salinity in drinking water can cause
health issues, especially during pregnancy and infancy5-9, such as higher risks of
miscarriage, preeclampsia and hypertension, leading to higher maternal and infant
mortality. Additional health issues that arise from drinking saline water include
headaches, diarrhea, abdominal pain, gastric ulcers and immunological effects10-11.
Although addressing saline drinking water is one of the Sustainable Development
Goals12, few empirical studies have examined the impact of drinking saline water on
the livelihood of coastal communities.
Drinking water wells along the coast are especially susceptible to salt water
intrusion, a situation where a salt water wedge moves inland and creates a saline
mixing zone that can render the water unpotable13-14. Salt water intrusion accelerates
during hydrologic droughts because it reduces groundwater recharge and the thickness
of the freshwater zone, generating conditions that mirror the characteristics associated
with pumping wells15-17. Without recharge, the flow of groundwater to the shoreline
decreases, the depth to groundwater increases, and the zone of mixing moves inland
and upwards. Climate change can further aggravate the problem of saline intrusion in
eastern Africa through prolonged droughts and sea level rise4.
Saline drinking water can also be a source of chronic poverty through
declining labor productivity and disincentive for permanent water infrastructure. In
many rural developing economies where stable water infrastructure is lacking,
collecting water is a labor-intensive task, where productive labor (often women) is
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spent on fetching water18. Excess salinity can cause wells to be abandoned, creating
conditions where households spend more of their productive time traveling further in
search of drinkable water19 and hence lowering labor productivity, i.e., a potential
source of chronic poverty. Additionally, communities may have less incentive to
invest in permanent water infrastructure when they expect water salinization in the
future, resorting instead to temporary or distant water sources which could be more
costly and unsustainable. Lack of basic water infrastructure has been found to be a key
determinant of vulnerability to drought20-22. Combined, excess salinity can create
mutually reinforcing feedback loops between drinking water and chronic poverty,
leading households to fall into a poverty trap and face further shortages in safe
drinking water. However, empirical evidence to support these arguments are lacking.
To shed more light on these issues, we provide an integrated assessment of
drinking water salinization as a potential driver of chronic poverty in Tanzania, where
nearly half of its 57 million people do not have improved access to safe and clean
water. We first assess the vulnerability of coastal communities to saline drinking water
by comparing salinity levels of drinking water wells and households’ perceptions of
water. We then examine saline drinking water as a potential source of chronic poverty
through two potential mechanisms: 1) impact on household members’ health; and 2)
impact on the time required for water collection.

2. THE STUDY DESIGN
2.1 Study site
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We conduct our study in 14 villages in coastal Tanzania, six of which are
located in the Pangani District of Tanga Region and eight in the Rufiji District of
Pwani region (Figure 1). All villages are immediately adjacent to the shoreline, on
level terrain and with most of the wells located 50-300 meters from the shore. This
study uses coupled micro-level data of seasonal water samples of drinking water wells
from two coastal regions, coupled with detailed panel household surveys. Salt water
intrusion in rural Tanzania has been noted in shallow aquifers, adjacent to the shore,
that are not subject to pumping23 . The risks of salt water intrusion are higher in sandy,
permeable aquifers, in wells closer to the shore, and in aquifers with minimal flow to
coastal waters.
Our analyses of precipitation data (1981-2017) in coastal Tanzania show signs
of prolonged drought, likely to have contributed to excess salinity in well water.
During the decade leading up to 2016, when this study was conducted, both Districts
experienced prolonged periods of hydrologic drought (Figure A.1a and 1b). Rufiji had
7 out of 10 years with below-normal annual rainfall; Pangani had 9 out of 10 years
below normal—in fact, rainfall was below normal eight years in a row (Figure A.1a).
Moreover, the monthly average rainfall in the recent decade was below the 30-year
normal in 10 out of 12 months in Rufiji and 9 out of 12 months in Pangani (Figure
A.1b).The pattern of rainfall between 1981 and 2010 was periodically punctuated by
years with high precipitation (e.g., > 1 SD above the mean) that can generate
groundwater recharge, but no high precipitation years occurred in the decade
preceding the study.
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All sample villages are in rural remote areas characterized by chronic poverty,
where the access to basic infrastructure for drinking water, sanitation and electricity
are lacking, and the use of petroleum products for cooking, lighting, pumps or
generators is rare. (Table A.1). Transportation is constrained by poor roadways to
most of the villages. Overall, Rufiji District has a higher incidence of poverty and is
more severely lacking in public infrastructure compared to Pangani District. In our
study area, 19 percent of the sample households in Rufiji and 10 percent in Pangani
ate only one meal a day during the week prior to the survey. Education attainment is
also limited: 43% of the household heads in Rufiji and 30% in Pangani had either no
or only some primary education.
Water infrastructure also reflects the differences in poverty between the two
regions. Most households in Rufiji District rely on temporary, shallow (i.e., < 3 m),
hand-dug pit wells (unlined) as their primary source of drinking water. In contrast, the
majority of households in Pangani District rely on permanent, deeper (i.e., >5 m), dug
wells lined with brick or concrete. In term of sanitation, 38 percent of the households
in Rufiji and 21 percent in Pangani do not have any type of collection area for human
wastes; others mostly use dry pit latrines. Almost all sample households lack access to
electricity (derived from generators), with only 3 percent (all in Pangani District)
having electricity as the main source of power.
2.2 Overview of the methods
We use coupled micro-level data of water samples from drinking water wells
with detailed panel household surveys implemented in 2016-17 from 156 households
in 14 subvillages in two regions in rural coastal Tanzania. Both types of field data
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were collected three times within a year (August 2016, February 2017, and May 2017)
to account for seasonal variation in rainfall. August is typically during the long dry
season, while February is typically the period immediately following the short rain
season and May is in the middle of the long rain season. In 2017, some villages did not
experience the short rain season resulting in a prolonged dry season when the second
round survey was conducted in 2017.
To examine the vulnerability of the communities to saline drinking water, we
surveyed 70 drinking water wells (30 wells in Pangani, 40 wells in Rufiji) currently
in use in the 14 sampled subvillages We obtained data on construction materials,
surface area, well depth, depth to water, and the salinity levels at the surface and
bottom of the wells. Household surveys were designed to elicit information related to
drinking water sources and perceptions of water quality and quantity, labor allocation,
livelihoods, and a suite of poverty indicators, including socioeconomic characteristics,
hardships, sanitation and food security.
We aggregate the well data at the subvillage level and then merge with the
household survey data. The coupled data is used to characterize the salinity levels of
well water, drinking water source(s) across seasons, and households’ perceptions of
water quality. We then use panel data methods to estimate the impact of salinity levels
on households’ health and labor supply for collecting water, carefully controlling for
confounding factors that can potentially bias the coefficient estimates such as access to
healthcare.
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3. RESULTS

3.1 Well structures and drinking water sources
The data reveal wide regional differences in the structure of the drinking water
wells, reflecting the extent of water infrastructure development (Figure 2). The wells
in Pangani District are more permanent in nature with 75% lined with either concrete
or brick casing and another 13% hand pump or piped faucet. Of the thirty wells
sampled, only one was constructed in the past two years. In contrast, nearly 80% of
the wells in Rufiji District were temporary, open, hand dug pit wells, and
approximately half the wells were less than two years old. Pumps were absent from all
but one of the wells in the Rufiji region. In wells without a pump, water was collected
by lowering buckets into the well water. These distinctions in well construction in the
Pangani and Rufiji regions correspond with differences in the depth of water within
the wells: the Pangani wells had several meters of waters from the well bottom to the
surface of the water; in contrast, the Rufiji wells were much shallower with most
containing < 0.5 m of water in the wells. Although none of the wells in the two
regions were greater than 10 meters deep, we refer to the unlined pit wells of Rufiji
that were less than 3 meters as “shallow wells”.
The distinct well construction methods in the two regions reflect the
differences in the severity of drought and the ways in which communities have
adapted. Based on long-term PDSI records, the Rufiji region experienced prolonged
periods of severe drought more frequently than Pangani. The Pangani region
experienced mild and severe drought for only 21% and 5% of the period of record,
respectively, with no severe droughts between 1917 and 1996. In contrast, the Rufiji
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region was classified as experiencing mild or severe drought in 66% and 25% of the
116 years of record, respectively. The majority of the Pangani wells were permanent,
lined, and extended deeper into the groundwater, reflecting an investment predicted on
long term use while most in Rufiji were shallower temporary hand dug wells. The
latter are well suited to take advantage of the shallow freshwater lens that can develop
above saline groundwater in coastal aquifers. If this type of well is abandoned due to
lowered water tables or increased salinity, creating a new well requires a minimal
investment of time and materials. We frequently observed abandoned dug wells in
Rufiji during our fieldwork. Notably, three of the hand dug wells that we sampled in
Rufiji in August 2016 were already abandoned by February 2017, while seven
additional hand dug wells were not functional in May due to being overflooded with
rainwater.
The household survey data confirmed these regional differences in the sources
of drinking water and further revealed seasonal variation (Figure A.2). During the long
dry season (August), about 70% of the households in Rufiji rely on their temporary
and shallow dug wells. During the wet season (May), about half of those households
diversify into publicly-owned, unlined or lined wells. In contrast, the majority of
households in Pangani utilize the publicly-owned, lined or unlined wells in both
seasons. Notably, 30% of the households in Pangani have access to piped water in the
wet season, which becomes unavailable in some communities during the dry season.
No piped water is available in Rufiji.
The data reveal that communities in Rufiji have limited water sources during
the long dry season (Figure A.2). During the long dry season, villages in Rufiji had an
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average of only two sources of water (shallow, hand-dug wells or public, unlined
wells) per household and more than 25% of the wells on average were not functioning
in February 2017. In contrast, they utilize six sources during the long rainy season
when water is more abundant. In Pangani, while more than 90% of the wells were
functioning across the three seasons, households are also affected during the long dry
season because water was not available from piped water from outside the villages.
These findings strongly indicate lack of secure drinking water in both districts.
3.2 Water salinity levels and household perceptions
The water salinity levels varied significantly between the two regions, in part
reflecting the depth of water within the wells (Figure 3). In August 2016, 21% of the
wells sampled in Pangani and 8% in Rufiji exceeded the salinity threshold of 3.25 ppt
(parts per thousand), with levels in several of those wells exceeding 6.4 ppt.
Similarly, in February 2017, 24% of the wells in Pangani exceeded the salinity health
threshold, with a couple of them registering salinity levels exceeding 12.8 ppt. In
contrast, only 4% of the wells in Rufiji exceeded the salinity health threshold. In May
2017, 26% of the wells in the Pangani region exceeded the salinity threshold while all
the samples from Rufiji were below the threshold. Among the high salinity wells in
Pangani, 11.1% had salinity between 6.4 ppt and 12.8 ppt and 22.2% of the wells had
salinity > 12.8 ppt. The communities of Kipumbwi Mji Mku, Sange Kitijini, and
Stahabu in the Pangani region as well as Kilambani in the Rufiji region appear most
vulnerable, as each had multiple wells with salinity values exceeding 3.25 ppt.
In addition to excess salinity, we also found wells which were completely dry,
exacerbating the drinking water problem. In August 2016, three wells in Rufiji that
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had been used in recent years (based on key informant responses) were completely
dry. In February 2017, seven wells were completely dry (2 in Pangani, 5 in Rufiji). In
contrast, during May zero wells were dry – likely due to the onset of the rainy season
(Table A1.3).
The perception of water quality from the household survey data underscores
the severity of the saline drinking water (Figure A.3). In the August survey, over 60%
of the sample households indicated that they experienced saltiness in their primary
source of drinking water. Nearly 50% of the households in Pangani and 30% in Rufiji
said their water “always” tasted salty in the past four weeks. About 63% of the
households in both regions experienced saltiness in drinking water at least once,
underscoring that salinization of drinking water is an urgent and critical issue that
affects livelihoods across both coastal regions. Moreover, poorer households are more
likely to have tasted saltiness in their primary drinking water.
Households perceive drought and water salinization as among the top three
nature-based shocks throughout all three seasons (Figure A.4). In February 2017, 77%
of the households reported experiencing drought. Water salinization is also critical
during February, when the households largely indicate water salinization affecting
both water for drinking and for cropping. The survey data also revealed that the
households have few adaptation strategies to deal with water scarcity (Figure A.5).
When households were asked what they would do if their primary source of water
became unavailable, close to 75% of the households stated that they would find or dig
another well, and fewer than 10% of the households stated that they would purchase
water. These findings are consistent with the structure of the wells we observed in
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Rufiji where some shallow wells were abandoned and other shallow well pits were
dug recently.
3.3 Impact of salinity on health and labor productivity
Descriptive statistics
According to our data, 21% of the adults in Pangani and 17% in Rufiji had health
problems that limited them from working (Figure 4, Table A.2). On average, the
proportion of adult household members with health issues limiting them from working
are 0.63 adults per household (std=0.98) in the Pangani District and 0.58 adults per
household (std=0.97) in the Rufiji District. There was some seasonal variation, with
May being the worst in Pangani while February was the worst in Rufiji.
The average water collection time per week, normalized by household size,
was 131 minutes (std=481) in Pangani District and 77 minutes (std=100) in Rufiji
(Figure 4). These differences in part reflect the differences in the well structure: fewer,
permanent, fixed wells in Pangani as compared to a greater number of temporary
shallow wells in Rufiji; the shallow wells in Rufiji are closer to people’s homes on
average than compared to the permanent wells in Pangani. The task of collecting
drinking water is primarily performed by female adults in their 20s and 30s, the age
range associated with the most productive in income-generating activities and hence
having a high opportunity cost of time (Figure A.6). This setting differs from other
studies where water is collected mostly by children24-26.
Regression analysis results
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We find that higher salinity level in well water is associated with more adults
with health problems preventing them from working (Table 1). On average, a one
standard deviation increase in salinity level is associated with 3.35 percentage point
increase in proportion of household members having a health problem. For an average
household, a two standard deviation increase in salinity would increase the proportion
of household members with illness from 15% to 22%. This magnitude suggests that
the problem of saline drinking water has a moderate effect on the available adult
household labor, undermining productive activities of the households.
On the other hand, we do not find consistent evidence that higher salinity is
associated with longer time to collect water (Table 2). Rather, the model results
suggest that deeper depths to well water level due to drought conditions are associated
with more labor supply for water collection. These drought conditions also correspond
to an increase in dry wells (e.g., fewer wells available) and lower potability (due to
high salinity or other factors, such as taste, sediment or odors) . Specifically, a one
standard deviation increase in water level depth is associated with 32% more labor
supply (roughly 31 minutes per week per capita) for water collection. These results
were consistent when the proportion of functioning wells in the subvillages (another
water scarcity indicator) was also controlled for in the model (Table A.3). In sum, the
results suggest that labor supply for water collection is driven primarily by water
scarcity, which is corrlated with salinity but also with other problems such as odor and
clarity. ¥ This additional time in water collection reduces labor productivity and takes
time away from other productive livelihood activities.
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4. DISCUSSION
This study assessed the vulnerability of communities to salinization of local
drinking water sources in two coastal regions in Tanzania. We found stark differences
between the two regions in terms of well structure: temporary, unlined, hand-dug
shallow wells were dominant in the Rufiji region, which is relatively poorer with more
severe drought. In comparison, more permanent, lined wells were the dominant well
type in Pangani. The very shallow wells in Rufiji intercept just the top of the
groundwater, and are constructed to access the shallow freshwater lens that floats
above saline groundwater. In contrast, Pangani is dominated by permanent deeper
wells that frequently extend several meters into the groundwater and can thus intercept
more saline groundwater. Therefore, it is not surprising that Rufiji wells are less
saline even though Rufiji experienced more prolonged periods of drought.
The results from regression modeling, which controlled for potential
confounding effects at the household level and seasonal effects, suggest that salinity is
associated with more adults with health problems preventing them from working. We
did not find that salinity is the key driver of more labor supply for water collection, but
instead that increasing water scarcity is associated with more time for water collection.
The combination of dry and flooded wells from climatic extremes—drought and
floods—as well as high salinity contribute to more time spent collecting water due to
the scarcity of potable water sources.
One limitation of this study is that the salinity level was averaged at the
subvillage level, which may not exactly reflect the salinity level of households’
drinking water. Another limitation is that the health indicator is broad--it captures any
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types of health problems which prevented household members from working. Future
studies may consider collecting more specific health indicators associated with excess
water salinity and other water pollution problems. The study also points to the need for
monitoring salinity levels of drinking water as part of poverty reduction in coastal
communities.
Nevertheless, this study illustrated the severity of the saline drinking water
problem and the vulnerability of these coastal communities. We found indications that
salinity could contribute to chronic poverty, which can further constrain households
the means to access and invest in safe drinking water. These problems are likely to be
exacerbated with climate change with increasing drought and floods, a key factor that
is likely to influence the livelihoods of the rural households in Sub-Saharan Africa this
century.
Sustainable solutions to this wicked problem for these rural coastal
communities must be affordable, pragmatic and accessible for the poor, overcoming
the current lack of energy sources. Some potential solutions include rainwater
harvesting and cistern construction at the individual household and/or community
level; low-cost Tubular Solar Still27; and solar-powered desalinization28
5. METHODS
5.1 Precipitation and drought data
To gain insight into the severity and duration of drought conditions that
prevailed during our study, we obtained the Palmer Drought Severity Index29 in the
months preceding sampling to examine the duration of mild (< -1.0), moderate (< 77

2.0), severe (< -3.0), and extreme (< -4.0) droughts and compared those results to long
term data (1901 to 2016). During the first sampling period of our study, both the
Pangani and Rufiji regions were in the grip of a prolonged and severe drought. In the
Pangani region, mild drought (PDSI < -1) began in 2008 and did not end until
November 2016. Periods of continuous severe drought conditions (PSDI < -3)
occurred in 2009-2011, and again in 2013 and 2014. Between 2009 and 2014, a total
of 17 months was classified as extreme drought (PSDI < -4). This was the most
extensive and severe drought during the 116 years of record. In Rufiji, the second
worst drought of record in terms of duration and severity began in 2007 with mild
drought. Between 2009 and December of 2016, the region experienced 85 months of
severe or extreme drought, and within this period 39 months had PDSI <-4, the
threshold for extreme drought conditions.
Precipitation data (ERA5) for the study site from 1981 to 2017 was obtained
from the Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S)30. ERA5 data are at 0.25 degrees
x 0.25 degrees resolution and the locations for this study were selected based on
proximity from each sampled drinking water well. All the locations included in the
statistics are the closest to at least one of the surveyed drinking water wells in our
study in one of the directions. The 30-year annual and monthly 78 normal were
computed by taking the mean for 1981-2010.
5.2 Water sampling
To assess the vulnerability of each sampled community to saline waters in their wells,
we gathered electrical conductivity measurements at the surface and bottom of 30
wells in the Pangani District and 40 wells in the Rufiji District during three periods:
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August 2016, February 2017, and May 2017 (Table A4.1 and A4.2). A total of 210
measurements were taken across three rounds, along with their GPS coordinates and
depth to water level. Salinity levels were measured via electrical conductivity
measurements using a calibrated YSI Pro30 handheld conductivity meter. A portable
YSI Pro30 conductivity meter was calibrated following the manufacturer’s guidelines;
the manufacture accuracy is +/- 2.0% of the reading or 1µS/cm, whichever is greater31.
To avoid community suspicion about water sampling, we enlisted key informants
residing in each village to guide us to community wells and to observe all
measurements and structural characteristics. Key informants provided information on
the dates of construction, approximate number of households using the wells, and if
applicable, the approximate date that the water within the well first tasted salty.
A salinity health threshold, which was compared to our series of electrical
conductivity field measurements, was derived from prior estimates of risks associated
with excess intake of sodium5. Sodium intake is used as a health risk indictor because
of the adverse impacts of hypertension, which is one of the strongest risk factors for
cardiovascular disease (e.g., heart attacks, stroke, heart disease, arrhythmia). The
World Health Organization recommends that the daily intake of sodium, from all
sources, should not exceed 2 grams/day32. We followed the approach of an empirical
study of pregnant women hypertension risk associated with saline coastal wells in
villages in Bangladesh. That study recommended that the daily intake of sodium
should not exceed 2.33 grams/day5. Because we assumed that drinking water to be the
only source of sodium intake, we chose to use the World Health Organization’s more
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conservative recommendation of 2 grams/day in calculating an upper conductivity
(parts per thousand; ppt) threshold.
We assumed that the salinity in the coastal wells was due to saltwater intrusion
from the adjacent marine waters, and contained the same relative concentrations of
sodium to total salt content (0.308 g sodium per gram of seawater salt33. Thus, 2
grams/day of sodium is obtained by ingesting 6.49 grams of seawater salt per day.
Based on the approach of Khan et al. (2011), we assumed that people consume 2 liters
of drinking water per day, which yields a threshold of 3.25 grams of salt/liter (3.25
ppt). We also highlighted salinity levels approximately two and four fold higher (i.e.,
6.4 and 12.8 ppt, respectively) than this threshold to highlight more severe degradation
due to salinity.
5.3 Household survey data and regression analysis
The 14 subvillages for this study were selected randomly by applying
population proportional to size sampling. In each subvillage, ten households were
randomly selected from village rosters with replacement households for attrition. The
household survey was implemented in Swahili by a team of trained local enumerators.
The participant households received a nonmonetary compensation (e.g., a bag of
sugar) for participating in the survey in each round. The survey was programmed in
Surveybe, a software for computer-assisted personal interviews, and implemented
using tablets. The key variables from the survey used in this study include the time
that the households spent collecting water, perceptions about how water tastes,
primary water source(s), and whether or not a household member experienced health
problems that limited the adult member from work (Table A.2).
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The goal of the empirical analysis is to identify 1) the relationship of drinking
water salinity level on health, and 2) how households change their labor supply for
drinking water collection with increasing salinity level. Salinity level should be
exogenous to households because households do not cause salinization directly.
However, there are a few identification problems. First, people’s health status and
labor supply can change for a variety of reasons other than excess salinity levels.
Second, the salinity levels measured at each well does not necessarily equate to
individuals’ exposure because people can adapt by taking measures (i.e., using water
from other sources) to reduce their exposure. Moreover, individuals who have taken
measures to reduce exposure to salinity in drinking water may do so because they are
wealthier, better informed, have access to healthcare, or just have greater cause for
concern about their health. Because of these potential problems, a simple comparison
of households who live in subvillages with high salinity level versus low sanity level
confounds the effect of salinity with these other factors.
To deal with these confounding factors, we implement and compare alternative
models. Some models include household characteristics from the household survey
(age, education attainment and gender of the household head.) Other models include
household fixed effects to control for all time-invariant observables. Some models also
add round fixed effects to control for unobservable factors common to all the sample
subvillages in each survey round, which essentially captures seasonality. We also test
whether water scarcity has an independent effect from water salinity on health and
labor using two indicators of scarcity. The first indicator is water depth of each well
(distance between the top of the well and the water level, where larger numbers
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indicate more water scarcity). The second indicator is the percentage of functioning
wells in each subvillage in a given round, where the denominator is the total number
of wells in the subvillage which were functioning in at least one of the three rounds.
One caveat in this study is that water salinity and depth are both seasonal and
correlated with each other. Once the seasons are controlled for in the model, it may
absorb some of the variation in these key variables across seasons for each well.
Moreover, the correlation between salinity and water depth is not low (0.242); large
correlations can lead to multicollinearity problems. Due to these caveats, we compare
coefficient estimates from several models.
Specifically, to measure hardships in health, we ask ‘In the past 3 months, did
member j have health problems that limited the kind or amount of work member j
could do?’ We hypothesize that the level of salinity increases the probability of
household members having health problems. To estimate the effect of salinity on
health at the household level, we estimate the following model:
𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡 +𝜌𝑖𝑡

(1)

where 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the proportion of adult members in household I having
health problems that limit the amount of work they can normally perform in the past
three months leading up to the survey in season t. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the average salinity
concentration and 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the average water depth of the wells in the subvillage of
household i in season t. We also estimate model (1) with observable household
characteristics, or alternatively household fixed effects (𝛼𝑖 ) to account for
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unobservable factors at household level and round fixed effects (𝑠𝑡 ) to account for
seasonality.
To obtain information on the key variable water collection time per capita, we
first ask whether or not a household member j usually fetches water to the household.
If yes, we then ask ‘In the past 7 day, how many minutes did member j spend time
fetching water?’ We then aggregated the number of minutes across all members in the
household, and divided the total by the household size to obtain water collection time
per week per capita. We hypothesize that higher level of salinity in drinking water
increases the time the households spent in fetching water. To test this hypothesis, we
estimate the following model:
ln (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑠𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)

where 𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 ) is the log of number of minutes that household i spend in
fetching water per week per capita in season t. The robust standard errors are clustered
at the sub-village level to reflect the sampling framework. As a robustness check, we
also controlled for a second indicator of water scarcity: the proportion of functioning
wells in each subvillage in a given round, where the denominator is the total number
of wells in the subvillage which were functioning in at least one of the three rounds.
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Notes: The maps were created by McNally using GPS coordinates from field data. The data
for mangrove cover is from the Global Distribution of Mangroves USGS dataset34, which
can be downloaded from data.unep-wcmc.org/datasets/4.t The photos show the most
common type of wells in each region—a concrete-lined, permanent well in Pangani and
an unlined, shallow, hand-dug well in Rufiji.

Figure 1 Study site, location of surveyed households and wells, and photos of the most
common type of wells in each region.
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Data: Authors’ well survey.

Figure 2. Regional comparison of well structure
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Notes: The red line indicates the threshold level of 3.25 ppt. Percentages indicate the
proportion of wells exceeding this threshold. This computation excludes wells
unmeasurable due to flooding or drying up.
Figure 3. Salinity levels of drinking water wells in Pangani and Rufiji Districts in
August 2016, February and May 2017.
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Panel A: Proportion of adults in the household with health issues preventing them from work
in the past four weeks (per capita), by region and survey round

Panel B: Natural log of household labor supply to collect water, by region and survey
round
Figure 4: Adults with health issues preventing them from work (Panel A) and
labor time to collect water (Panel B)

90

91

Note: The 30-year normal for each district is calculated as the mean of annual rainfall between 1981-2010.

Figure A.1a. Annual mean precipitation for Rufiji and Pangani Regions compared to the 30-year normal, 2007-2016.

Note: The 30-year normal for each month in each district is the mean of monthly rainfall between 1981-2010.

Figure A.1b. Monthly mean precipitation for Rufiji and Pangani Regions compared to the 30-year normal, 2007-2016.
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August

May

Source: Household survey data
Notes: N=138 in August and N=140 in May.

Figure A.2 Primary source of drinking water in August 2016 (top) and May 2017
(bottom). Arrows indicate switching of water sources between long dry and wet
seasons
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Source: Household survey in August 2016. N=138 (N=80 in Rufiji; N=58 in Pangani)

Figure A.3. Household perception of how frequently the primary drinking water tastes
salty, August 2016
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Figure A.4. Top-three perceived risks by sample households in August 2016,
February 2017, and May 2017
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Figure A.5. Households’ adaptation strategies to water unavailability
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Figure A.6. Average time spent in collecting water per week by ages in August 2016,
February 2017, and May 2017
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Table A.1. Comparison of household characteristics associated with poverty (%)

Variable
Poverty
Poverty headcount
Pit latrine
Sanitation
Flush toilet
No toilet
1 meal/day
Meals
2 meals/day
No education or has not started
Some Primary Education
Primary Education (Standard 7)
Education of head of
Some Secondary Education
household
Secondary Education Form 2
Secondary Education Form 4
Other
Fishing
Primary source of
Farming crops
income
Other

Pangani
21.9
66.67
12.12
21.21
10.34
62.07
12.12
18.18
62.12
3.03
1.52
0
3.03
51.72
10.34
15.52

Rufiji
33.7
57.30
4.49
38.20
18.75
51.25
31.11
12.22
50.00
1.11
0
2.22
3.33
28.75
36.25
18.75

Data sources: All data from authors’ survey data except for poverty headcount.
Note: The meals question was asked in the context of the previous week of the
survey in August 2016.
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Table A4.1 Wells exceeding the health threshold of 3.25 ppt salinity or drying out
completely
Village/well

Salinity Measurements (parts per thousand)
August 2016
February 2017
May 2017
Pangani District Wells
Kipumbwi Mji Mku/well 1
4.88
----Kipumbwi Mji Mku/well 4
6.82
13.03
3.78
Kipumbwi Mji Mku/well 5
--3.75
--Sange Kitijini/well 2
3.37
4.95
5.47
Sange Kitijini/well 3
6.67
7.18
--Stahabu/well 1
--4.04
3.99
Stahabu/well 2
5.44
No water
3.26
Stahabu/well 4
--No water
--Ushongo Mabaoni/well 1
7.81
14.14
7.74
Rufiji District Wells
Doka/well 2
--No water
--Doka/well 4
No water
----Kilambani/well 2
3.86
----Kilambani/well 4
5.17
Well not operating
--King’ongo/well 2
7.34
6.27
Well closed
Kitogani/well 1
No water
----Kitogani/well 4
--No water
Well flooded
Mgambo/well 4
--No water
--Mkirika/well 5
No water
No data
--Mkurumu/well 6
--No water
----- denotes value was below the salinity threshold
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ABSTRACT
Natural resources can serve as a safety net, an especially important benefit for poor
communities that have limited access to formal risk management tools. This study
examines the insurance function of mangrove-dependent artisanal fisheries and
illustrates potential tradeoffs associated with extractive uses of mangrove forests on
which people also depend for subsistence. We use original panel data from a
household survey conducted in coastal Tanzania, including information on shocks,
labor for fishing, extractive uses of mangroves, and measures of poverty. The results
suggest that households that encounter a greater number of natural and idiosyncratic
shocks spend more time fishing. The poorer households also rely heavily on mangrove
trees for firewood and home building. Collectively, the results indicate that this
setting, characterized by ecologically interlinked resources, presents already
impoverished people with a difficult tradeoff in which depletion of mangrove forests
is likely to lead to a poverty-environment trap through multiple mechanisms.
JEL Classification: C33, D19, O13
Keywords: artisanal fisheries, mangrove forests, poverty-environment trap, safety net,
shocks
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INTRODUCTION
Poverty stemming from vulnerability to weather risks is prevalent around the world
and growing with climate change, especially for rural households whose livelihoods
depend heavily on natural resources (Hallegatte et al. 2018; Hertel and Rosch 2010;
Hope 2009). There are numerous formal and informal ways to manage and cope with
such risks. Among them, natural resources provide opportunities to smooth
consumption and income. For instance, several studies have found that non-timber
forest products serve as safety nets for farming households in developing countries,
functioning as a risk coping strategy in the wake of weather shocks such as floods and
droughts (Pattanayak and Sills 2001; McSweeney 2005; Völker and Waibel 2010). In
general, the studies found that the natural insurance benefit the poorest households the
most (Fisher et al. 2010; Debela et al. 2012). However, this natural insurance can be
lost when the resource that provides it is linked to another resource under threat, an
issue that has been overlooked in the literature.
The primary goal of this study is to provide new empirical evidence regarding
the dependence of rural households on benefits from two ecologically linked
resources: artisanal fishing as a type of natural insurance to protect livelihoods and
mangrove forests, which provide multiple basic needs such as energy and housing
materials. Provision of artisanal fisheries and wood products by mangrove forests can
be viewed as ecosystem services in which the wood products are extractive uses and
the artisanal fisheries are non-extractive uses. When mangrove forests are depleted,
both types of services are lost.
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Mangrove forests are one of the world’s most threatened tropical ecosystems,
having been depleted for wood and converted to agriculture and coastal development
(Ghosh et al. 2015; Goldberg et al. 2020; Richards and Friess 2016). At the same time,
fish habitat is a key ecosystem service of mangrove forests for many coastal
communities (Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2008; Anneboina and Kumar 2017). Small-scale,
artisanal fishing in the tropics depends ecologically on mangrove forests (Hutchison
et al. 2014; Islam and Ikejima 2010). The fisheries can be broadly categorized as two
types: inshore mixed-species and crustaceans. Fish depend on mangroves for nurseries
during their early life stages while crustacean species, including crabs, prawns, and
bivalves, feed on the leaves.
The ecological links between mangroves and fish and crustaceans lead to
tradeoffs for impoverished coastal households. When mangrove forests are
overharvested for wood or damaged in storms, their function as fish habitat can be
lost, thus further depriving households that turn to nearshore mangrove-dependent
fishing to cope with idiosyncratic economic shocks, a benefit that is not well
documented (Abdullah et al. 2016; Debrot et al. 2020). We test whether poor coastal
households engage in greater artisanal fishing, a small-scale fishery using relatively
low-technology fishing practices and mostly for local consumption, when they face
idiosyncratic shocks unrelated to weather and climate conditions and natural
synchronous shocks such as flooding and storm surges. In addition, we test the extent
to which coastal households rely on extractive benefits of mangrove forests and
whether relatively poorer households depend disproportionately on mangroves for
wood products and fishing.
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Specifically, we analyze panel data from a survey of 156 households in 14
coastal villages in Tanzania conducted in three periods: August 2016, February 2017,
and May 2017. The survey collected detailed information on the households’ exposure
to droughts, floods, pests, salt water intrusions, and other natural events and exposure
to idiosyncratic shocks such as family disputes, health issues, price shocks, and loss
access to financing. Using a household fixed-effects model, we estimate the effect of
these types of shocks on weekly household labor allocations to fishing. The
households are further divided into quintiles based on wealth index scores constructed
using variables from the survey data and following a multi-dimensional poverty
approach (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006; Balen et al. 2010). We then test whether
poorer households depended more heavily on extractive uses (firewood and building
material) and non-extractive benefits (fishing) of mangroves than more affluent
households.
This study makes three contributions to the literature. First, we provide new
empirical evidence regarding how coastal resources serve as natural insurance against
idiosyncratic economic shocks for impoverished households that depend on such
resources. Though a majority of the global population is concentrated in coastal areas
and mangrove forests are one of the most threatened tropical ecosystems in the world,
the existing literature on such insurance has focused primarily on farming households
and terrestrial forests (Wunder et al. 2014). Coastal communities are likely to face a
different set of natural risks – primarily, storm surges, flooding, erosion, and water
salinization – and, therefore, to need different risk management strategies than inland
communities (Navarro et al. 2020; Shammi et al. 2019; Vatsa 2004). Subsistence-level
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coping strategies such as income smoothing and income diversification play crucial
roles in ensuring the livelihood of coastal communities (Paul and Routray 2011). To
our knowledge, only one study has examined fishing as a potential form of natural
insurance; Takasaki et al. (2010) analyzed household decisions of farming families
forced to engage in river fishing because of crop failures. The study addressed the
choice of whether to fish at the extensive margin and involved a single type of
environmental shock. Our study uses panel survey data from rural coastal households
in Tanzania to characterize multiple types of shocks, identify available risk
management strategies, and determine whether the households use artisanal fishing as
a coping strategy.
Second, we shed light on tradeoffs between extractive and non-extractive
mangrove ecosystem services. Extracting wood from mangrove forests leads to loss of
the forests and, therefore, to loss of the non-extractive services they provide, including
fish habitat, coastal protection, and carbon storage. Many members of coastal
communities, especially poor ones, depend critically on extractive benefits of
mangrove biomass and on non-extractive fishing for their livelihoods. Additional
empirical evidence of this phenomenon among coastal communities can provide
information critical to understanding mangrove forests as social-ecological systems, a
subject that remains largely unexplored.
Third, we examine the effect of poverty on extractive and non-extractive
resource uses by constructing a refined multi-dimensional poverty indicator. Most
poverty measures used in the literature to test dependence on natural resources have
been based on household assets and incomes (e.g., Narain et al. 2008; Charlery and
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Walelign 2015). We use detailed household survey data on infrastructures, sanitation,
and housing materials to capture multiple dimensions of household wellbeing. We
then use the resulting wealth index to classify households in the dataset into wealth
quintiles and compare their relative use of mangrove extraction and fishing.
Our empirical analyses reveal two major findings. First, households that
experienced a relatively large number of shocks spent more time fishing, indicating
that fishing functioned, in part, as a coping mechanism and economic safety net. The
effect was largest for households in the bottom quintile of wealth. Furthermore, longterm natural shocks such as droughts and water salinization had a greater effect on
time spent fishing than short-term natural and idiosyncratic shocks. Second, poorer
households extracted greater quantities of resources from mangrove forests than
wealthier households. Together, these findings illustrate dependence of the
impoverished households on two coastal resources that are ecologically linked. Their
livelihoods depend on extraction of wood products from mangrove forests, and that
extraction destroys fishing resources on which they also rely.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework of this study builds on Barrett et al. (2011), which
identified several mechanisms that create interlinkages between biodiversity and
development of poverty traps. A poverty trap is a “self-reinforcing mechanism that
causes poverty to persist” (Azariadis and Stachurski 2005). Mangrove wetlands often
develop such poverty-environment traps in which poor communities depend
disproportionately on limited natural resources to sustain their livelihoods. Essentially,
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the poor make a living by combining their labor with natural capital such as farming
and fishing, and their returns depend on the quality and quantity of natural resources
available to them. When the stock of natural resources cannot grow as rapidly as the
human population relying on it, the marginal labor of productivity and standards of
living decline.
Depletion of mangrove forests can lead to poverty-environment traps. In many
tropical countries, mangrove wood is used for cooking fuel and building materials
(Adanguidi et al. 2020; Dahdouh-Guebas et al. 2000; Walters 2005). Low-income
households rely on firewood for cooking because it costs less than kerosine and
charcoal. However, as a fuel, firewood is less energy efficient and collection of it is
labor-intensive (Wiskerke et al. 2010; Hoffmann et al. 2015); it is used only in
subsistence economies (Luoga et al. 2000). Thus, firewood is an inferior good, and
households switch to better types of fuel when their incomes increase (Guta 2014;
Pattanayak et al. 2004; Naylor and Drew 1998). Likewise, higher-income households
in the study area typically build homes using cement or bricks while low-income
households use mangrove wood (Aye et al. 2019; Wells et al.1998). Artisanal fishing,
which is supported by mangrove forest habitats, also provides poorer households in
coastal areas with income and sustenance. (Allison and Ellis 2001; Béné and Friend
2011; Degen et al. 2010). Consequently, depletion of mangrove forests can lead to
poverty traps when households have to invest more of their productive labor to meet
their needs.
To derive testable hypotheses, we rely on two theoretical economic concepts:
the permanent income hypothesis and the concept of inferior goods. The permanent
114

income hypothesis argues that agents make consumption decisions based on their
long-term incomes rather than on temporary increases and shortfalls in income
(Friedman 1957), and financial markets play a role in long-term streams of income.
Depending on the rate of interest charged on loans, people consume less (consume
more) and save (borrow) financial resources in current periods only if they expect that
their incomes will be less (more) in later periods.
In rural coastal Tanzania, as in many rural developing economies, financial
markets are incomplete or missing entirely. According to our August 2016 survey,
82 percent of the sampled households were not members of any credit or savings
groups.3 Therefore, we adapted the permanent-income-hypothesis model to assume a
borrowing constraint (Deaton 1991; Carter and Lybbert 2012). Our first hypothesis
states that households use natural resources as a safety net to smooth consumption and
that, in terms of consumption smoothing, households affected by a greater number of
shocks spend more time fishing than households affected by a smaller number of
shocks.
Our second hypothesis states that resources extracted from mangrove trees are
inferior goods (Hicks 1939) and that their consumption declines as wealth increases.
STUDY SITE
We conducted this study in coastal villages in the Pangani and Rufiji Districts in
Tanzania (see Appendix Figure A1).4 Both districts have large areas of mangrove
wetlands (especially in the Rufiji River delta) and are situated in one of the two largest
3

According to the survey, 77 percent of the sampled households had no health insurance and only one
household had any other type of insurance.
4
The Rufiji district was renamed Kibiti in 2020.
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mangrove sites in East Africa (Mshale et al. 2017). As elsewhere in Sub-Saharan
Africa, mangrove forests are under increasing threat. The trunks are being cut for
timber and poles and burned for charcoal, and large areas are being cleared to make
way for rice paddies, other types of agriculture, and urban development. Although it is
illegal to harvest mangrove wood without a permit, even for firewood, locals
increasingly rely on mangrove products for their livelihoods and allow outsiders to
illegally harvest timber and make charcoal to sell in the capital (Mungai et al. 2019;
Wang et al. 2003). Meanwhile, mangrove wetlands provide habitat for many fish
species, and a large proportion of rural coastal communities depend on artisanal
fishing for consumption and incomes.
Many rural coastal communities in the two districts are chronically
impoverished. Access to basic facilities such as electricity, clean drinking water, and
sanitation is scarce. According to our household survey data, about 60 percent of the
sample households used pit latrines and 32 percent did not have toilets. Most
households lacked access to electricity; only 3 percent (all in Pangani District) had
electricity as the main source of power. Food poverty is also a critical issue. In our
sample, 34 percent of the households indicated that they could afford only two meals a
day.
The data from our survey also reveal that these communities periodically suffer
from natural and idiosyncratic shocks and lack access to formal risk management
instruments such as credit and insurance. Fishing and farming are the dominant
livelihoods, which are periodically subject to weather shocks, such as a chronic
hydrologic drought that has struck there in the decade leading up to our data collection
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in 2016 and 2017, leaving them at risk of falling into poverty-environment traps and
making the region an important one to study.
METHODOLOGY
Data
We use data from a survey of 156 unique households in 14 subvillages in the Pangani
and Rufiji Districts of Tanzania in August 2016, February 2017, and May 2017. Of the
156 households, 66 were in Pangani and 90 were in Rufiji. Subvillages were randomly
selected by sampling populations proportional to village size. We randomly selected
ten households in each subvillage using village rosters. The attrition rate was small. In
cases in which the originally selected households dropped out, we randomly selected
replacement households from the roster for the second and third rounds of the survey.
The survey periods were selected to account for seasonal variations in rainfall.
In coastal Tanzania, August is part of a long dry season that typically is followed by a
short rainy season late in the year, and the February 2017 survey was intended to
capture the period immediately following the short rainy season. However, the region
received little precipitation in late 2016 and early 2017, resulting in an extended dry
season. The May 2017 survey was conducted during Tanzania’s long rainy season.
The sampled household members were interviewed in Kiswahili by local
enumerators. They were asked a variety of questions about their use of natural
resources, including extensive sections on mangrove use and fishing, short-term and
long-term natural shocks and idiosyncratic shocks, risk coping strategies, labor
invested in fishing, and their socio-economic conditions. The descriptive statistics
presented in Table 1 show that the average value of asset normalized by household
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size the participants was 346,174 Tanzanian shillings (TSH) (around 150 U.S. dollars
(USD)).
Empirical Strategy
We test the role of coastal natural resources as an economic safety net by examining
whether households turned to fishing of mangrove wetlands when their livelihoods
suffered from various kinds of shocks such as floods and droughts. To obtain unbiased
estimates, the shocks had to be exogenous to the households, but there was potential
endogeneity from unobserved household characteristics that could influence both the
number of types of shocks and time households spent fishing. For example, the
poorest households were likely to be most vulnerable to certain types of shocks and, at
the same time, were likely to lack much capacity to fish due to lack of capital and
relatively lower quality of fishing gears. In that case, ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimate of the effects of shocks on time spent fishing would be downward biased. To
account for such unobserved household characteristics, we employed the following
fixed-effects model at the household level to incorporate potential time-invariant
omitted variables.
𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌2 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡

(1)

where 𝑓𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the number of hours household i spent in fishing activities in
a week in season t, 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the shock experienced by household i in season t, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is
the log of assets value of household i in season t, 𝛼𝑖 represents household fixed
effects, and 𝜏𝑡 represents season fixed effects.
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The shocks tested in our variable of interest, 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑡 , were classified as
idiosyncratic, short-term natural, and long-term natural and were analyzed separately
using both dummy variables and the number of types of shock experienced by
households. Our survey addressed seventeen types of idiosyncratic shocks (see
Figure 1) that included influences on production, consumption, finances, health,
family wellbeing, and land security. As shown in the figure, the idiosyncratic shock
that affected the greatest number of households was sharp increase in prices of
consumptive goods. About 83 percent of the households reported experiencing that
type of shock in August 2016.
The survey addressed nine natural shocks, including droughts, salinization, and
flooding, and whether they were experienced over the short term and the long term,
which we defined short term shocks as the shocks experienced within the past three
month prior to the survey while long term shocks were the shocks experienced in the
past 20 years. As shown in Figure 2, the short-term natural shock experienced by the
greatest number of households was drought, followed by salinization of drinking
water. During the long dry season represented by the August survey, pests or diseases
affecting crops before harvesting affected the second greatest number of households.
As shown in Figure 3, the long-term natural shock that affected the greatest number of
households (51 percent) was drought occurring over the preceding 20 years.
To test our first hypothesis, we estimated equation 1 using household fixed
effects to analyze the impacts of idiosyncratic and short-term natural shocks on labor
allocated to fishing. For long-term natural shocks, we used a Tobit model to analyze
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cross-sectional data. We chose the Tobit model because the observations for the
dependent variable, fishing time, contained numerous zero values (see Figure 4).
To test our second hypothesis, that resources extracted from mangrove trees
are inferior goods and are used primarily for subsistence living, we compared
extractive use of mangroves by the poorest quintile of households to extractive use by
the wealthiest quintile of households. We conducted a series of pooled cross-sectional
analyses since there is no meaningful seasonality in consumption patterns in the study
area. We first examined 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒_𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 , a dummy variable indicating that
household i used mangroves for at least one purpose in any season. We examined
mangrove use generally and for firewood and home building (the two most common
uses in the sampled households) specifically and report the results in Figure 5. We
then used the Tobit regression to identify any correlation between wealth and the
intensive margin of mangrove use by modeling the mass of mangrove use in threemonth periods measured in kilograms (kg).5 This measure of mangrove use is a
continuous variable, and many of the observations have zero values (Figure 6). The
Tobit regression’s left-censoring accounted for those zero values (Wagner and Wedel
2001).
The cross-sectional analysis allows us to employ our time-invariant indicator:
quintiles of wealth status. Following Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006), we constructed
an index for wealth status using a principal component analysis (PCA), which allowed
us to use information from multiple variables correlated with wealth and reduce the

5

Originally, the survey units were poles and batches . To create a single standard, we relied on the
information provided in the survey, in which 3 poles =1 batch = 45 kg.
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dimensions to create a single wealth indicator for each household. The indicator
includes traditional measures of wealth (e.g., assets) and dimensions such as sanitation
facilities, energy sources, housing materials, and water sources that characterize
residents’ livelihoods. These dimensions reflect the living conditions of rural
households in a developing country (Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003; Belen et al.
2010). The PCA method first calculates correlations between the factors of livelihoods
to create the principal components, composing of factors that strongly influence each
other and discounting the less-correlated factors.
The PCA generates a set of scores. Positive scores indicate that a household’s
possession of an item is correlated with relative wealth (see Appendix Table A1).
Most of the scores for asset items were positive, meaning that households able to
possess the assets were relatively wealthy. As expected, variables that had negative
scores included pit latrines, homes constructed of mud and wood, use of kerosine for
fuel, and earth floors. Possession of a flush toilet had a score of 0.213, indicating that
households that possessed one were wealthier than households that did not. We also
found negative scores for non-motorized fishing boats and fishing nets, which suggest
that wealthier households switched to more-advanced, more-expensive fishing tools
such as motorized boats and fish traps, which had positive scores.
We then applied the scores to each household based on the items they
possessed. The resulting household index scores ranged from –3 to 14 (see Appendix
Figure A2). More than 50 percent of the households had negative scores.
As a final step, we classified the households into quintiles by index scores in
which the first quintile indicated the poorest group and the fifth quintile indicated the
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wealthiest group. We compared the index scores to assets value of the households, as
shown in the scatter plot presented in Appendix Figure A3, and found positive
correlation between the scores and assets (0.45).
In the final step of the analysis, we used the PCA scores to explore associations
between mangrove use and the poverty quintiles for each season (survey date) using
the following model:
𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑣_𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 ∑5𝑗=2 𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝐗 𝑖 +𝜗𝑖 ,

(2)

where ∑5𝑗=2 𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents dummy variables equal to 1 when household i is in
quintile j and zero otherwise. The first (poorest) quintile serves as the baseline in the
model. 𝐗 𝑖 is a vector of the control variables for household i: size (number of
persons), and the age, gender, and level of education of the head of the household. The
majority of the household, 93 percent, have the education ranging from none to
primary level.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports the results of our analysis of correlation between idiosyncratic and
natural short-term shocks and time spent fishing. Overall, we find that fishing activity
increased with the number of shocks experienced. The estimated coefficients indicate
that an additional idiosyncratic shock (column 2) would increase the time spent fishing
by 1 hour 20 minutes per week, which is significant at the 0.01 level. An additional
short-term natural shock (column 4) would increase the time spent fishing by 2 hours
per week, also significant at the 0.01 level. On average, households spent about
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7 hours per week fishing so increases of 1 hour 20 minutes and 2 hours represent
19 percent and 29 percent increases.
The poorest (first) quintile exhibits the largest coefficients of correlation
between shocks and time spent fishing (columns 6 and 8). Though the coefficient
increases for the quintiles are not proportional, time spent fishing for the first quintile
households in response to an additional idiosyncratic shock is greater than time spent
fishing in the second, third, and fifth quintiles (0.01 significance level). For the
additional short-term natural shock, the poorest (first) quintile exhibits the largest
coefficient of correlation between the shock and time spent fishing: an increase of about
4 hours more than the time spent fishing by the fifth quintile households (significant at
the 0.05 level).
As shown in Table 3, the impacts of long-term natural shocks are even greater.
An additional long-term natural shock would increase the time households spent
fishing by 4 hours 21 minutes per week, approximately 62 percent given the average
of 7 hours. This result is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The coefficients of the dummy variables that represented households having
experienced at least one shock of any kind (columns 1 and 3 in Table 2 and column 1
in Table 3) are not significant, suggesting that variation in the number of shocks does
not affect time spent fishing at the extensive margin. Instead, the aggregate number of
shocks is correlated with time spent fishing.
When we tested for dependence on extractive benefits of mangroves (see
Table 4), we found that poorer households made more use of mangroves than
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wealthier ones. The estimated coefficients from the logit model show that the
probability of all uses of mangroves in the first quintile households is 76 percent,
which is 36 percent higher than the probability in the fifth quintile households with
significance at the 0.01 level (Table 4). Furthermore, the probability of mangrove use
declines when moving from the poorest to the wealthiest quintiles. We find this
pattern of low probability of mangrove uses associated with wealthier quintiles for all
mangrove uses collectively and for firewood but not for home building.
Likewise, the Tobit estimates of the mass of mangroves used indicate that
poorer quintiles are associated with greater consumption (see Table 5). Average use of
mangroves for firewood in the first quintile of households was 666 kilograms greater
than average use in the fifth quintile and about three times the average use overall of
221 kilograms in three months (p < 0.05).
The estimated coefficients of firewood use are statistically significant only for
the first and second quintile households, and the estimated coefficient of home
building is significant only for the first quintile households. Still, the averages for use
of mangroves for firewood and home building in the first quintile are the largest.
These results indicate that the poorest households relied most on extractive
uses of mangroves. And the reduction in mangrove use by wealthier households
indicates that mangrove extraction is an inferior good.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study investigates two mechanisms potentially linking natural resource use and
chronic poverty. We construct a wealth index that takes multiple assets into account in
124

which possession of more expensive assets points to greater wealth. Then, using panel
survey data from households in coastal Tanzania, we test the extent to which
households used fishing as a natural-resource coping strategy to ensure provision of a
livelihood in the face of various natural (weather- and climate-related) and
idiosyncratic (non-natural, such as failed markets and revoking of access to land or
financing) shocks.
Our estimates from cross-sectional and panel regression analyses indicate that
experiencing an additional shock was associated with greater time spent fishing. An
additional idiosyncratic shock was associated with an increase of 1 hour and
20 minutes of fishing per week while an additional short-term natural shock was
associated with an increase of 2 hours of fishing per week. Additional long-term
natural shocks were associated with increases of up to 4 hours and 21 minutes of
fishing time per week.
We also find that the poorest households relied heavily on mangrove extraction
for firewood and home building. Wealthier households shifted away from extractive
uses of mangroves, demonstrating that mangrove extraction is an inferior good.
Collectively, our analyses reveal that coastal households in the sample relied
on local natural resources as a safety net in the face of various kinds of shocks, as
demonstrated by their decisions to spend more time fishing. These results are
consistent with Takasaki et al. (2010), which found that farmers allocated greater labor
to fishing after suffering from a flood. Our results differ in that our households
allocated greater labor to fishing at the intensive margin rather than at the extensive
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margin. This disparity makes sense given that we used coastal households, many of
which already earned some of their livelihoods through fishing.
Our results also highlight the tradeoff faced by impoverished households:
choosing between extractive and non-extractive uses of mangrove forests. The
findings reveal that the poorest households are disproportionately dependent on both
mangrove uses, indicating that rapid depletion of mangrove forests is likely to lead to
poverty-environment traps. Degradation of the forests from extractive uses for
subsistence would likely reduce fish stocks as well, eventually reducing available food
and income for those who rely on fishing to smooth consumption. This setting
illustrates feedback interactions inherent to social-ecological systems in which the
output of one subsystem (mangrove forests) is an input for another subsystem (fish
ecosystem) (Berkes et al. 2016). Collapse of a mangrove eco-subsystem likely would
lead to collapse of associated mangrove-dependent fisheries.
Several important policy implications emerge from this study. First, the
findings reveal that lack of access to financial tools creates demand for natural
resources used to provide a safety net and, consequently, makes households that rely
on natural resources for their livelihoods unable to cope with shocks. We find that the
households in our study created such safety nets by committing greater time and
productive labor to fishing. Fishing in mangrove wetlands is a critical alternative
means of survival for this population, but its use as a safety net puts even greater
pressure on already heavily depleted coastal fisheries (Batista et al. 2014; Kronen et al.
2010). One way to curb this dependency is to provide rural coastal communities with
greater access to credit and insurance markets. Access to credit (e.g., microloans) not
126

only promotes sustainable livelihoods for rural poor communities to alleviate poverty;
it also improves the coping and adaptive capacities of the communities in response to
shocks (Bhuiyan et al. 2012; Fenton et al. 2017). Conservation and restoration of
mangroves in these areas are essential to efforts to sustain both extractive uses and
mangrove-dependent fish stocks. Our findings imply that such efforts (e.g., promoting
adoption of alternative cooking fuels) will be most cost-effective when directed at
poorer households in coastal communities and that mangrove conservation alone
cannot sustain coastal fisheries. Management of heavily exploited fisheries (e.g.,
Hamidu 2014) will have to be strengthened.
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Figure 2. Number of households affected by short-term natural shocks. Panel A:
August 2016 (N = 138); Panel B: February 2017 (N = 140); Panel C: May 2017
(N = 141)
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Figure 4. Time spent fishing per week (N = 184, bin = 50)
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Figure 5. Number of households that used mangrove trees by purpose and season
(August N = 138; February N = 140; May = 141)
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Notes: (1) 37 households indicated zero use in all three seasons and are excluded from the analysis.
(2) The figure shows up to 500 kg of mangrove use for illustrative purposes and thus excludes 34
samples. Still, the uses that exceed 500 kg are included in the regression analysis.

Figure 6. Mass of mangrove use per three months for all purposes and seasons
(N = 145, bin = 10)
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable
Asset value1 (Tanzanian
Shilling)
Household size
Age of head of household
Female head of household
(1 = Yes)
Mangrove use for all purposes2
(1 = Yes)
Mass of mangrove use for all
purposes3 (kg)
Mangrove use for firewood
(1 = Yes)
Mass of mangrove use for
firewood
Mangrove use for home building
(1 = Yes)
Mass of mangrove use for home
building
Time spent fishing4
Experienced idiosyncratic
shocks (1 = Yes)
Number of idiosyncratic shocks5
Experienced short-term natural
shock (1 = Yes)
Number of short-term natural
shocks5
Experienced long-term natural
shock (1 = Yes)
Number of long-term natural
shock5

Obs.

Mean

SD

Min

Max

419

346,174

979,323

0

10,500,000

419
411

4.83
48.37

2.269
16.74

1
20

15
90

411

0.14

0.34

0

1

419

0.427

0.495

0

1

419

221.03

808.73

0

9,075

419

0.36

0.48

0

1

419

85.35

368.27

0

6000

419

0.17

0.38

0

1

419

121.36

578.61

0

5400

419

6.914

15.809

0

140

413

0.94

0.24

0

1

413

3.29

2.89

0

15

419

0.76

0.43

0

1

419

1.53

1.41

0

7

156

0.65

0.48

0

1

156

1.6

1.66

0

7

Notes: (1) The asset value is normalized by household size. (2) The purposes of mangrove use
were firewood; home building; boat masts; food, medicinal, or cultural; and charcoal. (3) The
mass of mangrove use is in kilograms over three months. (4) Time spent fishing is in hours per
week. (5) The number of types of idiosyncratic shocks used in the survey is 17; the number of
short-term and long-term natural shocks is 9.
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Table 3. Cross-sectional Tobit estimation of effect of long-term natural shocks on time
spent fishing
Variable

(1)

Dummy of long-term natural shocks (1 = Yes)

8.932
(5.879)

Number of long-term natural shocks
–0.242
(2.084)
10.443
(33.147)
150
0.054

ln (assets)
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R2

(2)

4.353***
(1.509)
0.283
(2.055)
9.569
(32.248)
150
0.061

Notes: (1) Standard errors are shown in parentheses. (2) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
(3) February and May are in 2017, indicating when the households were surveyed and accounting
for seasonality with August 2016 as the baseline. (4) Time spent fishing was in hours per week.
(5) The control variables consist of household size (number of persons) and the age, gender, and
level of education of the head of the household; seasonal fixed effects; and subvillage fixed
effects.
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Table 4. Probability of using mangroves by wealth status of active users

Variable

1st quintile of wealth
2nd quintile of wealth
3rd quintile of wealth
4th quintile of wealth
5th quintile of wealth
Observations

All mangrove
uses

Firewood

Home
Building

0.759***
(0.049)
0.599***
(0.063)
0.570***
(0.069)
0.479***
(0.069)
0.398***
(0.085)
283

0.683***
(0.055)
0.500***
(0.064)
0.452***
(0.070)
0.362***
(0.067)
0.328***
(0.084)
286

0.324***
(0.056)
0.154***
(0.048)
0.280***
(0.062)
0.238***
(0.053)
0.164***
(0.061)
286

Notes: (1) Standard errors are shown in parentheses. (2) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 2.
(3) Mangrove use is the mass of mangrove used in the season (kilograms). (4) The probabilities are
the marginal effects of logit estimation of mangrove use in any season. (5) The control variables in
the logit regression consist of household size (number of persons) and the age, gender, and level of
education of the head of the household. (6) An “active user” is defined as a household in which any
mangrove use in any seasons is greater than zero.
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Table 5. Tobit estimates of wealth status by mangrove use

Variable

1st quintile of wealth (1 = Yes)
2nd quintile of wealth (1 = Yes)
3rd quintile of wealth (1 = Yes)
4th quintile of wealth (1 = Yes)
Observations

All mangrove
use

Firewood

Building home

666.29**
(269.64)
344.14
(278.63)
227.19
(283.37)
1.64
(281.00)
286

431.16**
(172.57)
342.88*
(177.02)
137.77
(181.87)
77.72
(181.88)
286

785.93*
(475.77)
–177.79
(519.66)
447.03
(496.82)
106.28
(484.88)
286

Notes: (1) Standard errors are shown in parentheses. (2) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. (3) The fifth
quintile of wealth is the baseline. (4) Mangrove use is the mass of mangrove used in the season
(kilograms) (5) The control variables consist of household size (number of persons) and the age, gender,
and level of education of the head of the household.
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APPENDICES

Figure A1. Study sites
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Figure A2. Distribution of wealth index scores from PCA

148

10

15

500000
400000
300000
200000

0

100000

-4

-2

0
2
Wealth index score

4

Figure A3. Relationship between wealth index scores and assets value
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Table A1. Principal component analysis
Variable
Asset item
Farming spray pump
Farming water tank
Fishing non-motorized boat
Fishing motorized boat
Fishing nets
Fishing traps
Motorcycle
Bicycle
Radio
Television
Mobile phone
Chair or sofa
Table
Bed
Mosquito net
Refrigerator
Livestock goats
Livestock cattle
Livestock chickens
Sanitation (1 = Yes)
Pit latrine
Flush toilet
No toilet
Lighting energy (1 = Yes)
Kerosine
Electricity
Candles
Batteries
Other
Housing material outside wall (1 = Yes)
Mud brick
Wooden planks
Cement
Stone/brick
Other
Housing material floor (1 = Yes)
Earth
Wood
150

Mean

SD

Factor score

0.032
0.006
0.288
0.006
0.936
0.712
0.109
0.359
0.635
0.083
1.026
1.353
0.929
1.910
2.686
0.019
1.769
0.628
5.372

0.210
0.080
0.495
0.080
2.957
2.263
0.313
0.736
0.643
0.277
0.950
1.886
1.240
1.272
1.785
0.138
4.276
2.203
6.072

0.251
0.192
–0.003
0.058
–0.011
0.013
0.175
0.219
0.249
0.212
0.168
0.151
0.260
0.194
0.177
0.181
0.036
0.167
0.048

0.609 0.490
0.077 0.267
0.308 0.463

–0.032
0.213
–0.091

0.513
0.032
0.006
0.128
0.314

0.501
0.177
0.080
0.335
0.466

–0.161
0.223
0.017
0.030
0.062

0.256
0.256
0.026
0.083
0.372

0.438
0.438
0.159
0.277
0.485

–0.066
–0.049
0.118
0.170
–0.034

0.660 0.475
0.026 0.159

–0.233
0.022

Table A1. Principal component analysis
Variable
Mean
Other
0.064
Housing material roof (1 = Yes)
Grass
0.006
Makuti
0.673
Wood/planks
0.083
Aluminum
0.186
Other
0.026
Primary water source (1 = Yes)
Public protected well
0.199
Public unprotected well
0.276
Shallow well
0.378
Trap/harvest rainwater
0.019
Purchase unbottled water
0.006
Piped water
0.058
Other
0.032
Note: Makuti is thatching made from dried coconut leaves.
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SD
0.246

Factor score
–0.012

0.080
0.471
0.277
0.390
0.159

–0.036
–0.227
0.045
0.188
0.122

0.400
0.448
0.487
0.138
0.080
0.234
0.177

0.161
–0.036
–0.132
0.055
0.011
0.035
0.001

